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Abstract 
 
In Norway, we assume that the government implement and enforce policies in an efficient 
manner. Yet, previous research suggests that a majority of Norwegian firms have been violating 
environmental regulations.  
 
The main objective of this thesis is to explore the regulatory and firm-specific factors that 
attribute to Norwegian firms’ level of compliance to non-tradable pollution permits over time. 
The plant-specific panel data is obtained from the Norwegian Environment Agency and includes 
monitoring results from oil and gas and land-based industry in the period between 1997 and 
2011. A logistic regression is applied to examine the level of compliance, consecutive violations 
and the severity of violations in question.  
 
We identify significant effects on compliance from both firm characteristics and monitoring 
methods used. We find that more thorough monitoring is an important factor to fuel greater 
compliance among Norwegian firms, with the potential to reduce the issue of asymmetric 
information and incentivize firm transparency. Additionally, we find that an increase in the total 
expected penalty may increase firms’ focus on precautionary measures, resulting in a reduced 
number of violations. Lastly, we do not find evidence that the level of compliance is higher than 
explained by rational crime theory, hereby renouncing the validity of the “Harrington paradox” 
among Norwegian firms with pollution permits.  
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Sammendrag 
 
I Norge antar vi at myndighetene implementerer og håndhever lover og regler på en god og 
effektiv måte. Likevel viser tidligere forskning at de fleste norske bedrifter 
bryter miljøreguleringer.  
 
Formålet med denne oppgaven er å undersøke enkelte regulatoriske forhold og bedriftsspesifikke 
faktorer, og i hvilken grad de påvirker overholdelsen av norske miljøreguleringer over tid. 
Anleggsspesifikke data er samlet fra Miljødirektoratet, og inkluderer kontrollresultater i perioden 
mellom 1997 og 2011. En logistisk regresjon er benyttet for å analysere nivået av overholdelse, 
sammenhengende eller etterfølgende avvik og alvorlighetsgraden av de aktuelle avvikene. 
 
Vi har identifisert signifikante effekter av både bedriftspesifikke faktorer og tilsynsmetoder på 
overholdelse av utslippstillatelser.  
 
Vi finner at grundigere tilsyn er en av de viktigste faktorene som bidrar til høyere grad av 
overholdelse av utslippstillatelser blant norske firmaer i henholdsvis olje og gass og land-basert 
industri. Grundigere tilsyn og gjennomgripende kontroller vil på sikt gi incentiver for åpenhet, da 
det vil bli vanskeligere å skjule lovbrudd. 
 
Videre finner vi at en økning i den totale forventede straffen potensielt kan øke bedriftens fokus 
på forebyggende tiltak, noe som igjen kan føre til en reduksjon i antall avvik. Vi finner ikke 
bevis for at nivået for overholdelse er høyere enn forklart av teorien for rasjonell kriminell atferd. 
Vi finner derfor ikke grunnlag for at ”Harringtonparadokset” finnes blant norske bedrifter med 
utslippstillatelser. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Norwegian government is planning what they call an “environmentally friendly 
restructuring” and municipalities are increasingly encouraging green behaviour by campaigning 
environmental awareness. While individuals are induced to minimize consumption, recycle 
household waste and bike to work, previous research reveals that a majority of Norwegian firms 
are violating environmental regulations (Ministry of Climate & Environment, 2014a; Nyborg & 
Telle, 2006).  
 
The alarming state of our global environment has led to an increased attentiveness to the climate 
debate. In Norway, increased media coverage on environmental issues has led to greater 
attention to the topic. There is a growing realization that we live in a world of imprudent material 
use, uncontrolled consumerism and fossil fuel dependency. As a result, individuals are faced 
with an increasing pressure to consider the environment in their every-day decisions. The same 
token should be expected of firms. It seems like a paradox that individual members of society are 
facing a greater social pressure to pollute less, when the environmental threat presented by firms 
is much larger.  
 
The OECD considers Norway one of the pioneers in international climate negotiations, and 
Norwegian public policy on environmental degradation to be among the world’s most ambitious 
(OECD, 2011). Environmental policy in Norway is coherent with the notion that norwegian 
firms face quite strict regulations such as green taxes, pollution fees, technology requirements 
and pollution permits. With thorough regulations, one should also assume that firms feel a 
pressure to abide. The relevant predicament here, in terms of social welfare theory, is the 
relationship between profit oriented firms and ecological sustainability. Within the literature, this 
has been a hot topic. Several authors claim that the contradictions between environmental 
conservation and profit can be a false dichotomy, and that firms are increasingly acknowledging 
the potential benefits of reducing environmental impacts (Porter & Van der Linde, 1995).  
 
Several studies have investigated firms’ compliance with environmental regulations, specifically 
in the US, and claim that firms comply at a higher rate than assumed. Heyes and Rickman (1999) 
 2 
denoted this as the “Harrington paradox”. In Norway, on the contrary, previous research indicate 
that the majority of Norwegian firms that have been granted non-tradable pollution permits have, 
in the past, been violating plant-specific demands, and consequently, the law (Walle, 2003; 
Nyborg & Telle, 2006). This leads us to believe that the regulatory framework in itself is perhaps 
stringent enough, but that the enforcement of the requirements may not be sufficiently effective. 
 
Norwegian research on the topic has used panel data from the Norwegian Environment Agency 
(NEA) to investigate compliance to pollution permits. Most of these papers have solely presented 
the data and used descriptive statistics to analyze the compliance in the regulatory environment 
in Norway (Walle, 2003; Telle & Nyborg, 2006). Several international studies have investigated 
similar cases of monitoring, enforcement and compliance to other “command and control” 
instruments through logistic regressions (Cohen, 1987; Winter & May, 2001; Stafford, 2002). 
We have, to the extent of our knowledge, failed to find similar studies on Norwegian firms’ 
compliance with non-tradable permits. Therefore, we are interested in investigating those factors 
that affect compliance through a logistic regression.  
1.1. Problem statement and hypotheses  
The objective of this thesis is to analyze Norwegian panel data on monitoring and enforcement to 
evaluate firms’ compliance to pollution permits. The intent is to look at what characterizes those 
firms who violate government-issued permits, and to establish if there is a recurring trend of non-
compliance. By examining all controls in the offshore and land-based industry that were 
performed by NEA in the period of 1997 to 2011, we will attempt to investigate the following 
research question: 
            
What are the factors that attribute to Norwegian firms’ level of compliance with pollution 
permits? Does the impact differ by: 
i. Firm characteristics 
ii. Monitoring methods 
iii. The period in which the control was performed 
From economic theory we tend to look at the individual, moreover the firm, in a relatively 
uncomplicated manner. As a general rule we assume that self-regarding agents have the 
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capability of making sensible choices with the intention of maximizing their own utility. Based 
on this notion, one can further assume that when a firm is facing an environmental regulation, 
there are some considerations that will account for the decision they will make. General 
assumptions about rational behavior would lead us to think that firms comply with regulations 
based on fear of being caught violating them, and consequently the punishment that follows, or 
because of some moral responsibility to comply.  
 
i. Firm characteristics 
As the decision to comply depends on a firm’s level of risk-aversion, and the magnitude of 
damage to the firm’s reputation and potential economic penalty if one is caught in violation, 
emphasis is given to firm characteristics, more specifically to the type of industry and risk class 
the firm belongs to. First, we will focus on the type of industry, where we have specifically 
looked at controls performed in oil and gas versus land-based industry. Firms in the oil and gas 
sector have notoriously been labeled as “bad guys” in terms of environmental performance, 
especially with regards to not carrying their share of responsibility in preserving natural 
resources (TNS Gallup, 2014). The public opinion may rest on the nature of the oil and gas 
industry per se; firms in this sector are generally perceived to have poor environmental 
performance because they are operating within a field that solely relies on non-renewable energy 
sources. Based on this notion, we postulate the three following hypotheses: 
 
H1a:  Oil and gas less compliant 
Firms in land-based industry are more likely to comply with the pollution permits than 
firms in the oil and gas sector. 
 
H1b:  More consecutive violations in oil and gas 
Firms in the oil and gas sector are more likely to have offenses in two or more successive 
controls than firms in land-based industry. 
 
H1c:  More severe breaches in oil and gas 
When caught in non-compliance, firms in the oil and gas industry are more likely to have 
severe violations than firms in land-based industry. 
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Further, we use NEA’s assigned risk classes as a measure to examine if the expected pollution 
threat of firms influence the level of compliance. The measure will also be used to explore the 
likelihood of consecutive violations, and assess the severity of the deviations. This will not say 
anything about the firm’s level of risk-aversion per se, however, the assigned risk class gives us 
some insight into the level of penalties the firm will be faced with, which increases the expected 
penalty. NEA’s firm-level risk classification will be explored in the following three hypotheses:  
 
H2a:  Less compliance in risk class 1 
Firms that represent the highest potential damage to the environment, designated by risk 
class 1, have a higher tendency towards violating the demands specified by the pollution 
permits than firms in lower risk classes. 
 
H2b:  Less repeated offenders in low-risk firms 
Firms that represent the lowest potential damage to the environment, designated by risk 
class 3 and 4, are less likely to have violations in consecutive controls than firms in risk 
class 1. 
H2c:  Less severe deviations among low-risk firms 
Firms assumed to represent the lowest pollution threat, designated by risk class 3 and 4, 
are less likely to have severe deviations than firms in risk class 1. 
 
ii. NEA’s monitoring methods 
The level and persistency of compliance might not solely be a factor of firm characteristics, but 
can have some relation to the type of monitoring method used by NEA. Here, we will investigate 
the control type and number of items controlled during an inspection. Moreover, since the NEA 
categorizes firms in their monitoring schedule based on previous performance, we will 
investigate if controls reveal more violations at firms that are monitored under particular priority 
based on previous non-compliance. This leads to the following five hypotheses: 
 
H3a:  System revisions find more violations  
The thorough and detailed system revisions uncover more violations of pollution permits 
than the shorter inspections. 
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H3b:  Emergency inspections find more violations 
Inspections that are performed on the basis of reported suspicion or in the case of 
accidents, so-called emergency inspections, are more likely to uncover violations than 
inspections. 
 
H3c:  Other controls find more compliance 
Other controls, including letter controls, random sample tests, noise controls and 
emission measurements, uncover few violations compared to inspections. 
 
H3d:  More items controlled find more violations 
Controls that investigate more than five items during a control more often reveal non-
compliance than controls that investigate fewer items. 
 
H3e:  Particular monitoring leads to compliance 
Previous offenders that are placed in the monitoring category with particular priority, are 
more likely to comply with pollution permits in the succeeding control than firms under 
normal monitoring. 
 
iii. The period in which the control was performed 
We also find that change in compliance over time is of interest. The time or period in which the 
control was performed may have an impact on the outcome in form of compliance, repeated 
violations or the severity of the infringement. Here, we distinguish between the aggregate effect 
on compliance for the entire period, and the short-term effect of the period around the financial 
crisis. We postulate the following three hypotheses: 
 
H4a:  Compliance increase as technology improves 
Compliance increases over time as there is an increased focus on environmental impact, 
and improvements in technology that will lead to lower marginal abatement costs.  
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H4b:  Compliance decrease after the financial crisisThere is a decrease in compliance in the 
period between 2006 and 2011, compared to the period before the early onset of the 
financial crisis. 
 
H4c:  More repeated offenders after 2005 
Firms are more likely to have consecutive violations in controls performed after 2005 
than controls undertaken before the early onset of the financial crisis.  
 
Additionally, by examining the findings from the hypotheses above, we are interested to see 
whether there is evidence of what is argued in much international literature; that there is a higher 
compliance rate than anticipated by rational crime theory. This predicament, denoted as the 
“Harrington paradox”, has been widely discussed within the literature with various evidence 
(Harrington, 1988; Heyes & Rickman, 1999). We will therefore conclude with a discussion on 
whether there is evidence of a “Harrington paradox” among Norwegian firms.  
 
Lastly, we have to consider the possibility that there are undetected violations, as the majority of 
firms with permits are not monitored each year. We do not intend to answer whether these are 
intentionally concealed, or if firms are speculating in breaking the law for economic gain. 
1.2. Outline of thesis  
In Chapter 2 we will present the Norwegian permit system, and provide an overview of the 
regulatory environment. Here, we will look at how permits are distributed, NEA’s monitoring 
process and the corresponding enforcement measures. In Chapter 3, a literature review of the 
theoretical framework that is used in the analysis will be introduced. Here, we will present 
research on compliance, monitoring and enforcement in regards to environmental regulations. 
The literature discusses the issues of asymmetric information in the principal-agent model and 
the efficiency of pollution instruments. Further, we will in this section review Becker’s model 
(1968) on rational crime theory, as well as the opposing “Harrington paradox” (1988). The 
applied method will be presented in Chapter 4, along with a description of the data, econometric 
models and variable construction. In Chapter 5, we will present the econometric analysis and 
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discussion of the results. Chapter 6,will provide a conclusive note, while policy implications, 
limitations and suggestions for further research are included in Chapter 7. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
Public policy that aims at reducing pollution can be divided into two types, direct and indirect 
regulations. Direct regulations, referred to as command and control instruments, set specific 
restrictions to the firm. The use of direct regulation entails technology restrictions and 
requirements for production and cleanup processes. This type is most commonly used through 
permits, which we will be examining in this thesis. Most economists, on the other hand, 
generally favor indirect regulations such as taxes and tradable quotas. These are market-based 
instruments that work by altering the structure of payoffs that firms and individuals encounter 
(Perman et al., 2011). 
  
These two forms of regulation, direct and indirect, often complement each other in the creation 
of an environmental policy. The identification of appropriate pollution instruments is a merit of 
careful consideration. In Norway, a combination of instruments are used to implement action to 
reduce pollution, such as the European Union (EU) emission trading scheme, environmental 
taxes, direct payments to Norwegian farmers, transport taxation and increased use of biomass as 
an energy source (OECD, 2011; State of the Environment Norway, 2015). As of today, there is a 
well-established permit system, with substantial monitoring and enforcement data on Norwegian 
firms. An overview of literature on the effectiveness of these permits will follow in Section 3.1.  
2.1. The Norwegian permit system 
On the basis of the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, Norway’s environmental 
policies are substantially influenced by the EU. As a consequence, environmental and climate 
policies of the EU are incorporated in Norwegian laws. Because of Norway’s close proximity to 
other European countries, it is in Norway’s interest that the EU follows strict environmental 
regulations, and that close cooperation is consolidated in the EEA agreement (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2013). Nevertheless, according to the OECD Environmental Performance 
Review, Norwegian regulations are more stringent, especially in terms of environmental 
permitting. The report also states that “enforcement is better targeted, risk-based and deterrence 
oriented” within the Norwegian system (OECD, 2011). 
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The Norwegian Government, in combined effort with the Parliament, decides the level of 
ambition for environmental policies in Norway. Further, the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and 
Environment is the main authority and holds the responsibility of ensuring integrated 
governmental climate and environmental policies in Norway (Ministry of Climate and 
Environment, 2014c). Beyond the jurisdiction of the Ministry, the system is decentralized in the 
sense that environmental responsibilities are levied to the county and municipal levels. 
 
The foundation of the Norwegian regulatory scheme is based on the polluter-pays principle, and 
the importance that policy instruments meet the criteria of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
Environmental policies are constructed based on the notion that those who produce the pollution 
should also carry the cost of cleaning, thus being responsible for the damage caused to the 
environment and human health (NEA, 2015a; Walle, 2003).  
2.2. The Norwegian Environment Agency  
The main executional and regulatory body is the Norwegian Environment Agency, 
Miljødirektoratet, also referred to as NEA. The agency is under the Ministry of Climate and 
Environment and is a merger of the former Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (NPCA) and 
the Norwegian Directorate for Nature Management (NEA, 2015a).  
 
“Our principal functions include monitoring the state of the environment, conveying 
environment-related information, exercising authority, overseeing and guiding 
regional and municipal authorities, cooperating with relevant industry authorities, 
acting as an expert advisor, and assisting in international environmental efforts.” 
                        - The Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA, 2015a) 
 
NEA has been assigned key tasks with the intention to achieve the national objectives set by the 
government and parliament. Among the variety of responsibilities, the agency’s executive tasks 
include monitoring air and water pollution, issuing pollution permits and enforcing that these are 
upheld. This work is performed in unison with the county governor and the local municipality 
(NEA, 2015a). 
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Every year, NEA receives an allocation letter from the Government and the Ministry, which 
serves as a one-year contract between the Ministry and the agency. In this document, NEA 
receives their assigned budget that should correspond with the set performance requirements, 
guidelines and focus areas that the agency is required to prioritize for the coming year. 
According to the allocation letter, the national objectives that are set by the ministry in 
Proposition 1S (2014-2015) are of political character, subsequently the burden to fulfill national 
goals should not be carried by any independent agency. Moreover, NEA holds the freedom of 
operations in the sense that it is the agency itself, based on their expertise, that decides and plans 
for monitoring and enforcement for the coming year (Ministry of Climate and Environment, 
2014b). 
2.3. The Norwegian Pollution Control Act  
The Norwegian Pollution Control Act of 1981, Forurensningsloven, was implemented with the 
intention of protecting the environment by limiting pollution and waste. The law states that all 
pollution that causes damage to the environment is prohibited unless an exception is specified. 
“This wide definition means that at the outset, practically any emission is illegal” (Nyborg & 
Telle, 2006). The Act is administered by the Ministry of Climate and Environment, and it is the 
Ministry in conjunction with NEA that holds the pollution authority on a national level. On the 
county level the jurisdiction is held by the Ministry or jointly by the county and county governor. 
At the more local level, it is the municipality that holds the decision power (Norwegian Pollution 
Control Act, §81).  
 
To fully understand the implications of this act, there must first be an understanding of how the 
term pollution is defined. The act states that pollution includes the “introduction of solids, liquids 
or gases to air, water or ground, noise and vibrations, light and other radiation to the extent 
decided by the pollution control authority, and effects on temperature which cause or may cause 
damage or nuisance to the environment”, as well as anything that can aggregate previous damage 
or combined with the above mentioned cause damage or nuisance (Norwegian Pollution Control 
Act, §6). What is considered to be ordinary pollution from schools, hotels, office buildings, 
private households, fisheries, agriculture, forestry and temporary construction activity is 
excluded from the prohibition as long as no special regulations have been issued, and pollution 
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from individual means of transportation is covered by different legislations (Norwegian Pollution 
Control Act, §5, §8). 
 
The Pollution Regulations, Forurensningsforskriften, is a provision of the Act, where the 
regulations relating to pollution control are further outlined, such as detailed information about 
fine levels and the application process (Norwegian Pollution Regulations, 2004).  
2.3.1. Permits 
Originally subject to the no-pollution legislation, firms are depending on pollution permits in 
order to attain a government-controlled exception from the Pollution Control Act. Today, there 
are issued 4 327 plant-specific pollution permits across all sectors, where 1 185 are issued to 
firms that operate in land-based industry and 84 permits are issued to offshore plants (NEA, 
2015b). These permits may specify maximum pollution levels in accordance to the specific firm 
and its industry, but can also demand qualitative measures within the firm. One of the most 
common requirements made to firms is the implementation of audit systems and internal routines 
to monitor their own environmental performance. These permits are thought to improve overall 
environmental performance by imposing firms to monitor, track and manage their environmental 
impact. Qualitative measures are also easier to validate by inspections as these can be visible 
through the firm’s precautionary initiatives. Maximum level of pollution, on the other hand, is 
difficult to measure due to the stochastic nature of emission (Nyborg & Telle, 2006). 
2.3.2. Firm Classifications 
In order to dispense pollution permits, and later inspect the adherence to these, NEA has a 
classification system that categorizes firms based on industry, type of pollutant, level of 
emission, nature of the recipient and vulnerability of the surrounding environmental habitat. 
A firm's risk class is determined in the application process and specified in the granted pollution 
permit. The classification can be changed according to §18 in the Norwegian Pollution Act 
(Klemetsen, 2015).  
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The firms are divided into four classifications based on the pollution threat. Risk class 1 is the 
strictest classification and consists of firms with the highest risk of pollution, while risk class 4 is 
considered to be firms with lower potential pollution levels. Table 2.1 illustrates the specification 
system that NEA uses. 
 
Table 2.1 Risk classification of firms with pollution permits 
Risk class Relationship between emission level and recipient Risk class description 
1 Significant emission, weak recipient Significant emission, medium recipient 
Strictest risk class, 
highest-risk firms 
2 Significant emission, good recipient Moderate emission, weak recipient 
 
High-risk firms 
3 Moderate emission, medium recipient Small emission, weak recipient Low-risk firms 
4 Moderate emission, good recipient Small emission, medium recipient 
Most lenient risk class, 
lowest-risk firms 
Source: NPCA, 1999; Klemetsen, 2015 
 
As seen in Table 2.1 above, firms are grouped based on emission level, from moderate to 
significant, and the recipients are ranked as weak, moderate or good. The nature of the recipient 
denotes the carrying capacity of the environmental good, such as the distinction between an open 
ocean and a small watershed (Walle, 2003). A further specification of this can be seen in Table 
2.2 below. 
 
Table 2.2 Evaluation of recipients 
Recipient Weak Medium Good 
Water x Medium large waterways 
in general. 
x All small waterways. 
x All small “threshold 
fjords.” 
x Municipal network. 
x Threshold fjords (except small 
ones) and closed coves. 
x Large waterways. 
x Medium large waterways 
without other strong interests 
attached. 
x Open ocean and most 
fjords. 
x Large watersheds without 
other strong interests 
attached. 
Air x Closed area (e.g. bottom 
of valley). 
x High pollution load. 
x High frequency of still 
wind or strong wind from 
source to populated area. 
x Recipient that lies between 
weak and good recipient. 
x Open terrain.  
x Affects few people. 
x No other significant 
emissions. 
x Good air circulation (no still 
wind or little inversion) 
Source: NPCA, 1999; Klemetsen, 2015 
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NEA has to perform an individual assessment of each firm to make a sensible judgment when 
determining the appropriate risk class. The general guidelines set by the NEA states that the 
assessment of emissions should take into account the actual level of emission and the potential 
risk of emission in case of an accident. Firms’ risk management and contingency plans, 
beredskapsplikt, should therefore be included in the overall assessment. Further, if NEA 
evaluates different risk classes based on discrete emissions to water or air, the firm must be 
placed in the strictest risk class of the two evaluations. Finally, noise pollution is not included in 
the classification system, but should be included in the overall discretionary assessment 
(Klementsen, 2015). 
  
In general, the risk of emission is considered greater in firms with large-scale industrial activities 
and offshore petroleum operations; therefore these types of firms are often classified with risk 
class 1 or 2. Firms that have been classified with risk class 1 are often large and more complex 
than other firms controlled by NEA. This often involves stricter requirements to the firms, and 
the requirements cover a wider variety of activities. The permits are modified and granted 
specifically to the firm based on the specific production process, waste types and industry. As 
briefly mentioned above, the classification can be changed according to §18 in the Norwegian 
Pollution Act (Klemetsen, 2015). However, from conversations with NEA it seems apparent that 
in practice, the licensing only changes if there are major alterations to the firms’ operating 
conditions. Hence, firms are not continually moved from one risk class to another unless there is 
a significant increase or decrease in the level of emissions (NEA; Orvik, 2015).  
2.3.3. Monitoring 
In addition to administering the distribution of pollution permits, monitoring of firms’ 
compliance to these is considered to be one of NEA’s most important contributions to upholding 
the Norwegian pollution permit system. 
 
In their strategy for inspection and enforcement, NEA has established an overview of their 
monitoring goals. Here, the agency emphasize their focus on risk-based inspections, better 
inspection results, swift and decisive action against severe deviations and good inspection 
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expertise. To achieve this, NEA has created several points of priority to follow in their 
monitoring work (NEA, 2013). 
 
Each fall, NEA forms a monitoring plan for the coming year according to the allocation letter 
from the Ministry. The control frequency is pre-determined, displayed in Table 2.3 below.  
  
Table 2.3 Monitoring frequency 
Risk class Freq. inspection * Freq. system revision 
1 Each year Every 3rd year 
2 Every 2nd year Every 6th year 
3 Every 2dn/3rd year - 
4 When needed - 
Source: Klemetsen et. al, 2013 
* Frequency of inspections can deviate from the schedule when violations are detected. 
 
The controls are risk-based, meaning that firms with the assumed highest likelihood of non-
compliance are prioritized when controls are planned. The potential consequences of non-
compliance are also factored in, meaning that firms are prioritized when the risk of severely 
damaging the environment is high if violations were to exist (Nyborg & Telle, 2006; Klemetsen 
et al., 2013). 
 
Even though controls are based on these pre-determined frequencies, the agency has to take a 
wide variety of information into consideration in order to construct a monitoring schedule, and 
chose a theme for the controls. The plan for the following year is based on studies done within 
the agency, as well as research from external sources. In addition, the agency has to consider 
experiences from previous inspections, including observations made by the county governor. 
Lastly, the yearly monitoring plan will include changes in existing laws, as well as the 
incorporation of new regulations (NEA; Orvik, 2015). 
 
In cases where new regulations are implemented, NEA’s procedure is to control these quite 
promptly. In addition to the regular monitoring schedule, NEA emphasizes the importance of a 
regulatory presence, which entails the possibility that all firms with pollution permits may be 
audited. In practice, this means that even firms with the lowest likelihood of pollution, such as 
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firms in risk class 4, should know that there is a chance that their permits will be controlled 
(NEA; Orvik, 2015).  
 
Even though NEA is the governing agent with power to economically sanction firms, the agency 
wishes to have a good dialogue with the inspected firms. Their focus during inspections is to 
achieve a process where collaboration and communication is essential, and where the agency and 
the firms work together to achieve desired results (NEA; Orvik, 2015).  
 
The NEA uses a wide range of approaches to ensure that controls detect all possible errors and 
deviations effectively. These are not only meant to detect violations, but also to verify 
information the firms themselves have provided. NEA’s monitoring methods can be divided into 
four main categories: inspections, system revisions, emergency inspections and other controls. 
Methods that are commonly used during several of these control types include examination of 
logs and other documentation, visual verifications, random sample tests, and controls of routines 
and instructions for reporting. Although there are different structures of the controls, they are all 
based on the principles of the ISO 19011 standard, which consists of guidelines for revisions and 
audits of management systems (NEA; Orvik, 2015; ISO, 2015). 
  
Inspections 
Inspections are brief and in some cases unannounced controls that are conducted in one day or 
less. The unannounced controls are performed to vindicate the legitimacy of the inspections, as 
well as to maintain the integrity of the government. As a control agency, NEA holds a 
responsibility to be an objective representative to the local community, general public, non-
governmental organizations and other stakeholders (NEA; Orvik, 2015). These controls will 
check specific requirements from the pollution permit, and will also assure that the firm has 
eliminated potential deviations or remarks from previous controls. Waste management, the 
production process, and handling of chemicals may also be controlled. The theme of these 
controls is determined in the yearly monitoring plan, and the above mentioned factors such as 
risk assessments, previous supervisions and current focus areas of NEA are contributing 
elements in the process (Walle, 2003).  
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System revisions 
System revisions are longer lasting controls, ranging from one to three days. Due to the 
complexity and duration of these controls, they are announced in advance and scheduled with the 
firm. The revisions are performed in collaboration with central employees at the controlled unit, 
and interviews are also conducted. These revisions perform a detailed review of the 
environmental management system as well as the internal control system. Instructions, processes 
and routines are thoroughly inspected (Orvik; NEA, 2015a).  
 
Emergency inspections 
When receiving reports about violations or particular suspicion, NEA performs emergency 
inspections. The purpose of these controls is to gain an understanding of the actual situation and 
gather evidence if there are deviations from the permit, and if criminal activity has indeed 
occurred. Emergency inspections are always announced (Walle, 2003).  
 
Other controls 
Other controls is a grouping of all tests and controls that are not included in other categories. 
This includes random sample tests, emission measurements, noise controls and letter controls. 
Along with Kjetil Telle from Statistics Norway, NEA has tested the effectiveness of issuing 
warning letters in the wake of controls. Their experience suggests that letter controls indeed are 
taken seriously by the firms and have incentivized correcting behavior (NEA; Orvik, 2015).  
 
All these four monitoring methods will end with a verbal notification of the control results. Here, 
the agent from NEA, or county-governor, will along with the firm representative agree on the 
terms of the control, as well as the conditions revealed. Further, NEA sends out a written report 
of those issues that have been revealed, number of violations and deviations given in the control 
(Walle, 2003).  
 
In addition to the above controls performed by NEA, self-reporting is required for firms in risk 
class 1, 2 and 3. The responsibilities of the firms are outlined in a publicly available guide to 
self-reporting issued by NEA (2010). Self-reported results are considered irrevocable and legally 
binding at the same level as results from controls performed by NEA or the county governor.  
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2.3.4. Enforcement and penalties  
In line with the collaborative monitoring process, the enforcement and penalty philosophies are 
trust-based. NEA often uses informal and administrative sanctions before filing formal 
accusations. This includes warning letters, increased controls, coercive fines, public access to 
control results, police reporting, and retraction of or changes to the pollution permit. Which 
action is taken depends on the seriousness of the violation (Orvik; NEA, 2015a). 
 
The severity of the violation is decided after the performed controls and evaluation of self-
reported results from the firms. NEA divides the detected issues into two categories; deviations, 
avvik, and remarks, anmerkninger. Deviations are defined as “failure to comply with the 
requirements established by law”, while remarks are defined as “conditions that are not covered 
by the definition of deviations, but that the supervising authorities find necessary to point out to 
protect the environment” (NPCA, 2001). Remarks are not considered a violation per se, but 
rather functions as a comment on deficient routines or procedures, while deviations are 
considered violations of the issued permit and the law. Deviations are not limited to cases where 
firms exceed the permitted emission levels, but also entails failure to comply with qualitative 
demands. Especially critical violations are labeled as severe deviations.  
 
When violations are detected, firms are usually issued a warning and a time period to solve the 
problem without other sanctions (Walle, 2003). Major violations, on the other hand, often cause 
immediate reactions. In the strategy for enforcement and inspection, swift and decisive action 
against severe deviations is a focal point (NEA, 2013). When a violation is deemed a severe 
deviation, NEA will consider legal action. Even when a legal claim is filed, NEA will continue 
their inspection of the incident parallel with the police investigation. The criminal case will be 
police responsibility, while NEA continues with the means they have available, such as coercive 
fines, letter controls and additional monitoring. This leads to a double burden for the firm. When 
a case has been reported to the police, NEA will avoid taking the case to the media, so they are 
sure not to get in the way of the investigation. However, in cases that are considered serious 
breaches but are not reported to the police, NEA states in their enforcement strategy that they 
will use the media to spread the information uncovered by NEA’s activities. Severe deviations 
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will also lead to stricter monitoring in the future, to further incentivize compliance (NEA; Orvik, 
2015). The intensity of monitoring is categorized into four categories shown in table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4 Monitoring categorization of firms with pollution permits 
Category Description 
0 Should be monitored less frequently 
1 Should be monitored normally, according to routine 
1 Should be monitored with particular priority 
3 Should be monitored with particular priority and legal action should be considered 
Source: Walle, 2003 
 
The categories indicate how frequent the plants will be monitored, and are based on an 
evaluation made by NEA based on firms’ past performance and the expected risk for the 
particular plant in the given industry. As previously mentioned, firms with severe deviations will 
often experience particular monitoring. 
 
In accordance with the polluter-pays principle, firms are responsible for covering the costs of 
controls. Applying firms also have to pay fees to cover the work of forming new permits, and the 
firms are also financially responsible to cover the cost of changes to existing permits. They are 
given a 30-day period to pay the bill, which is issued when the audit report is sent from NEA to 
the firm (Norwegian Pollution Regulations §39, 2004). The income from these controls go 
directly to NEA’s monitoring budget, and is used to cover costs of controls. 
 
The price of the extensive system revisions is calculated independently from risk class. The price 
is based on the cost of the control, such that the firms are divided into the four fee rate 
classifications in Table 2.5 on basis of NEA’s calculated use of resources during revisions. This 
is decided in an individual assessment for each firm (Walle, 2003).  
 
Table 2.5 System revision costs 
Fee rate Revision price (in NOK) 
Rate 1 223,500 
Rate 2 142,600 
Rate 3 84,800 
Rate 4 47,100 
Source: Norwegian Pollution Regulations §39-8 
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The prices of inspections and the fine levels are fixed within each risk class, as seen in Table 2.6. 
The prices of inspections are much lower than those of system revisions. As the frequency of 
controls is higher in the high risk classes, firms in these categorizations will not only pay higher 
fees per control, but face much greater abatement costs over time.  
 
Table 2.6 Inspection price and fine warnings 
Risk class 
Inspection price 
(in NOK) 
Fine warning* 
(in NOK) 
1 21,100 0 – 1,000,000 
2 15,900 0 – 500,000 
3 12,200 0 – 250,000 
4 4,700 0 – 50,000 
Source: Norwegian Pollution Regulations §39-6; Klemetsen et al, 2013 
* From 2012. Based on evaluation by NEA officer. Rarely as high as max. 
 
If a control detects violations, NEA issues a letter with a fine warning that the firm will have to 
pay if the violation is not corrected. The level of the fine warning is set by an NEA officer based 
on his or her evaluation of the violation. However, the fine is rarely set as high as the maximum 
limit (Klemetsen et al., 2013).  
2.3.5. Political influences 
Beyond the allocation letter received from the Ministry of Climate and Environment, there are 
additional political factors that could possibly affect NEA’s monitoring methods. As previously 
mentioned, the EEA agreement entails that the EU substantially influences Norway’s 
environmental policies. In some areas, NEA operates differently compared to other European 
agencies. This specifically relates to the philosophy surrounding monitoring and enforcement. 
Here, the agency expresses that there are some differences, both culturally and principally, in the 
methods that are used for administering and overseeing pollution permits within the EU and in 
Norway. In Norway, monitoring of pollution permits is built on mutual trust, cooperation and 
open dialogue between the agency and the inspected firm, where there is a clear governmental 
presence but without forced power (NEA; Orvik, 2015). 
 
In terms of the political influence on NEA’s monitoring methods, there is a recent push from the 
IEEP to impose more frequent controls, unison revision guidelines and more rigid penalties 
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across Europe, expanding beyond the EU to include countries in the EEA agreement. NEA has 
expressed some concern with a standardized inspection format on the basis of conflicting 
monitoring methods. Within the EU there are political inconsistencies, and the incorporation of 
these policies into the Norwegian framework could pose great challenges. Although member 
states within the EU are given the independence to construct domestic methods for monitoring, 
reporting and verification, this is not the case for the enforcement of these. Further, many of the 
member countries have different authoritative cultures, and perhaps weaker institutions. When 
the EU imposes strict enforcement demands to the member states, such as non-flexible high 
penalty for non-compliance, it may lead to a less effective policy (Kruger et al., 2007). This 
could potentially be a bad fit with the current Norwegian model. If these rules were to be applied 
within the EEA, and consequently Norway, then the NEA would be forced to implement harsh 
penalties, and rigid enforcement systems.  
 
Further, the IEEP is interested in an increased frequency of controls whereas NEA holds quality 
of controls, rather than quantitative measures, in high regard. NEA requires their inspectors to 
have strict qualifications to ensure that controls are properly and thoroughly executed. In 
addition, the agency is very careful in their monitoring when it comes to excluding monitoring 
errors; if there is any doubt, the firm will not receive a warning or deviation from the existing 
permit (NEA; Orvik, 2015). The recent push from the EU that there should be a standard format 
for environmental regulations across Europe is problematic to NEA due to fundamental 
differences in approaches in monitoring and enforcement methods. NEA relies on a trust-based 
monitoring system that includes user-oriented methods that encourage dialogue with firms, rather 
than forced power. (NEA; Orvik, 2015).  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1. Informational issues 
An environmental regulatory agency such as the NEA will, in practice, find itself in a position of 
having to make decisions based on restricted information. Theory implies that when two players 
act together where one holds information (the agent) and the other does not (the principal), a 
principal-agent model is created (Rasmusen, 1989). Here, Cohen (1987) states that the benefit of 
looking at compliance with environmental regulation in a principal-agent framework is that it 
can be helpful when modeling relationships that implicate incentives and risk sharing. The 
principal-agent model introduces the issue of asymmetric information where the principal, the 
regulator, has less accurate information about the agent’s internal actions than the agent itself. 
The principal’s lack of information specifically relates to the agent’s perception of risk, and the 
costs of complying with the regulation. 
 
There are two standard models within this framework. The moral hazard model states that the 
regulator cannot fully observe the action taken by the agent, that is to say that the principal has 
problems revealing if the agent actually is in compliance with the proposed regulation, which 
could lead to wrongful findings. Thus, the ex-post moral hazard includes making a type II error. 
The adverse selection model looks at the difficulty for regulators to observe the agent’s hidden 
characteristics, such as firms’ true marginal costs. Moral hazard and adverse selection often arise 
when the regulator does not successfully manage to incentivize the agent to reveal true 
information. A pollution mechanism that is not efficient can lead to a situation where the agent is 
led to engage in manipulative behavior by withholding information or claiming to be in 
compliance when in fact, they are not (Rasmusen, 1989; Romstad, 2005). 
 
Laffont (1995) explores the contradictions between cost minimization and level of risk taking. 
This relates to the issue of moral hazard, and the temptation to engage in “manipulative 
behavior”, as stated by Romstad (2005). In his article, Laffont discusses the potential trade-off to 
a firm when the focus is to minimize cost while being faced with regulatory demands, thus 
potentially leading to ex-ante moral hazard of increased risk-taking. Here, he uses the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill as an example to illustrate that agents are carrying responsibilities that can cause 
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large hazards to the environment, and society as a whole. This entails the lack of care, poor 
safety routines or external pressures to deliver on time and minimize cost. In his rather complex 
model, he concludes that the protection of large environmental risks cannot be left to the market, 
and a high level of coordination is needed to ensure that firms are not taking on too much risk 
(Laffont, 1995). 
 
It is well known that regulatory enforcement is difficult for a variety of reasons, as stated by a 
large body of literature (See Heyes, 2000; Shavell, 1986 for a review). Heyes states that it is 
troublesome to know true compliance rates with any certainty due to the nature of the regulatory 
requirements. He specifies that one should interpret compliance statistics with care due to the 
fact that government agencies sometimes categorizes firms and the polluting source as 
compliant, when in reality, the agency simply fail to demonstrate non-compliance (Heyes, 2000). 
Russell (1990) discusses in his study cases where estimates of compliance rates can be 
untrustworthy. Here, Russell points to the hazardous waste regulations in the US where he 
asserts that the EPA’s documentation of non-compliance is “.. largely a catalogue of speculations 
about the possible extent of illegal disposal” (Russell, 1990; p.261). However, Heyes argue in a 
previous study that by increasing the thoroughness of the controls, it can induce firms to 
substitute towards more transparent technology. This specifically relates to the monitoring 
agency’s equipment, and that these are of such standard that reduces inaccuracy (Heyes, 1994). 
 
When pollution is stochastic, meaning that there is an irregular occurrence of emission, and NEA 
does not have full information about its source or size, the type of monitoring and enforcement 
strategy is especially important. Further, Heyes (1998) argue that thoroughness of inspection has 
a better effect on firms’ environmental performance rather than an increased frequency in 
controls. The methods NEA has at hand must be evaluated on the basis of their productive 
capacity. As mentioned in section 2.3.3 Monitoring, the agency holds quality and diligence of 
controls in high regard, and all inspectors are required to meet strict qualifications. As 
monitoring equipment is better, and the methods for inspection are more rigorous, it may ensure 
that firms’ actions become more transparent and that the firms engage in less “manipulative 
behavior.” 
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Regulations should create incentives for firms to disclose information. The question that arises is 
how the regulator can create effective policies while having imperfect information. In terms of 
command and control instruments such as non-tradable pollution permits, asymmetric 
information can lead to difficulties for the regulator when monitoring and enforcing the 
regulation. Because firms may indulge in manipulative behavior, it is according to much 
literature even more crucial that the monitoring frequency is right and that inspection standards 
are upheld with a rigorous hand. 
3.2. Effectiveness of pollution control instruments 
NEA claims that cost-effectiveness and efficiency are important criteria in their permit system 
(NEA, 2015a). However, most economists tend to favor market-based instruments like indirect 
regulations to achieve this. According to standard economic theory, indirect regulations such as 
tradable quotas, green taxes and subsidies are considered more efficient and cost-effective than 
direct controls because they create incentives to the agent to voluntarily change behavior, while 
doing so in the least-cost manner. Hence, market-based instruments encourage firms to find the 
least-cost way of abating at the margin, while achieving the level of desired environmental 
quality. This often entails investing in technological advancements (See Tietenberg, 1990; 
Stavins, 1995).  
 
Nevertheless, there are also other measures to evaluate environmental policies by than efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness. Hahn and Stavins (1992) state that other important factors include ease of 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement capability, clarity to the public and not the least, 
political feasibility. Despite the various literature on cost-efficient emission reduction, direct 
regulation may have appealing effects such as “the power to get results quickly and provide 
certainty of outcome, although not always in the most efficient way” (Perman et al., 2011). 
Pollution permits might be especially preferable for highly localized pollution problems, where 
source-specific criterions may be necessary. In terms of the efficiency issue, this especially 
relates to the transaction cost of ensuring compliance through monitoring and enforcement (Hahn 
& Stavins,1992). 
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Klemetsen et al. (2013) extends the argument for non-tradable pollution permits by claiming that 
this type of regulation can, despite what general theory claim, create incentives to the firm. In 
their paper they investigate Norwegian panel data on non-market regulations and whether these 
can spur innovation in environmental technologies. They measure environmental innovation as 
the type and number of patent applications of environmental significance. Patent has been used 
as a measure in other empirical studies as well (see Dechezleprêtre et.al, 2011). In their article, 
Klemetsen et al. results suggest that there is an incentive for firms to invest in new technology 
and that this arises from the probability of being sanctioned, that is the total expected penalty, 
and not simply from being inspected. 
 
In order to incentivize firms to comply with the law, and not emit more than the received 
pollution permit, the government threatens to sanction firms through fines, permit withdrawal or 
possibly prosecution. These sanctions can indirectly result in negative publicity to the firm. 
While market-based instruments such as pricing and indirect regulations generally are considered 
first-best policy instruments, Klemetsen et al. provide new evidence that pollution permits give 
an incentive to the firm through threat of sanctions, rather than as a result of other regulatory 
costs, such as increased inspection frequency as the polluter pays for monitoring cost (Klemetsen 
et al., 2013). 
3.3. Rational crime theory 
Within the literature, there are contrasting opinions on what motivates firms, and individuals, to 
comply with environmental regulations. Knowledge about the ways in which firms think and 
make decisions about compliance is essential when building an environmental regulation and 
designing effective enforcement systems (Winter & May, 2001). General assumptions about 
rational behavior would lead us to think that firms comply with regulations based on fear of 
being caught violating them, and consequently the punishment that follows.  
 
Rational crime theory has been linked to violation of environmental regulation, and can give 
some insight to why firms are in non-compliance. Becker (1968) constructed a model that 
showed that an increase in penalties will reduce the total benefit by committing a crime, thus 
lead to less violations of the law. The main point of Becker’s model is to prove that when 
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compliance costs are higher than the expected penalty, the firms will have an economic incentive 
to violate the law. As a result, one could claim that the certainty and size of the fines and the 
monitoring frequency, i.e. the likelihood of being caught, affects the motivation for compliance 
(Becker, 1968). 
 
Becker’s model has some limitations, especially when he assumes that the firms are risk-neutral, 
as well as the intuition that all violations that are discovered will be penalized and that there is no 
probability of wrongful conviction. The model is static, which indicates that the results of 
previous controls will not affect future sanctions if violations are detected. Further, Becker 
assumes that the firm is cost minimizing and he treats the penalty function as just another 
expense to the firm. Many of these assumptions were made to simplify the model, and make it 
hold. Several authors have attempted to change the assumptions in order to explain the model. 
One of the critiques that have been prevalent is the fact that the model is static, and does not 
consider previous behavior. This can not be considered a very realistic assumption, since it 
assumes that a firm only has two choices; to comply with the regulation or to violate (Becker, 
1968; Heyes, 2000; Walle, 2003). 
 
Harrington on the other hand, developed a theory that conflicts with Becker’s model. Here, he 
attempted to examine how firms in the US responded to environmental regulations by including 
a dynamic perspective where previous behavior was taken into consideration. In the article 
“Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted”, he proposed that firms will not be induced 
to comply if the probability that a violation will be sanctioned is low. Harrington’s much 
discussed paper starts by making three statements; (i) For most cases the monitoring frequency 
low, (ii) Even when violations are discovered, fines or other penalties are rarely assessed and are 
small compared to the cost of complying, yet (iii) It is still evident that firms comply most of the 
time (Harrington, 1988; p.29). Here, Harrington defines a low monitoring frequency as 1-2 
controls per firm each year. One of the assumptions for Harrington’s model is that there is little 
asymmetric information between the agent and the principal. This would entail that the firm 
knows what methods the regulator uses and how they are classified by the agency, and the 
regulator knows the firm’s individual cost of compliance (Harrington, 1988; Walle, 2003). 
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A note to be made is that most of Harrington’s paper is based on previous studies in the US. 
Many authors have argued that the “Harrington paradox”, as it was labeled by Heyes and 
Rickman, is based on little empirical evidence, and Cohen goes as far as to call it “stylized facts” 
(Cohen, 2000; Heyes & Rickman, 1999; Heyes, 2000;). Despite the theoretical focus of 
Harrington’s paper, other authors have repeatedly used his points as though they proved sound 
empirical evidence for better firm-compliance, and consequently greater environmental 
performance, than what is stated in rational crime theory.  
 
Many authors have examined Harrington’s statements and Becker’s model of rational crime to 
explain firms’ behavior and motivations to comply with environmental regulations. Nonetheless, 
it is important to consider the likelihood that real compliance decisions are continuous by nature. 
As discussed in Heyes article (2000), Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1979) did a notable study on 
compliance with industrial effluent standards. In this study, they argue that when permit 
standards are raised, some firms will violate rather than pay the increased costs of higher 
technological standards. The authors claim that once the decision to not comply has been made, 
the extent of the violation will depend on the magnitude of the increased fixed costs. Further, the 
authors claim that firms may have incentive to provide at least some fraction of what the 
regulatory agency wants (Heyes, 2000). This is, according to Shavell (1992) the “principle of 
marginal deterrence”. By ignoring to understand this concept, one can justify many of the 
apparent paradoxes of observed behavior from previous studies (see Harford, 2000; Harrington, 
1988). For example when Harrington claims that the penalty should be restricted, it indicates that 
raising the level of penalties may worsen compliance, which in return contradicts the “principle 
of marginal deterrence” (Heyes, 2000; Shavell, 1992). As an example, if a firm was given the 
same punishment for a severe violation such as dumping hazardous waste into the sea as for the 
less serious violation of poor internal routine when managing waste disposal, the firm could 
make the “rational choice” of always dumping the waste in the sea because it would give the 
same punishment, and ensure a lower cost. Thus, it is crucial that the regulator understands that 
firms have to make continuous decisions where the dynamics of incentives, such as increasing 
penalties with the severity of the violation, can affect the level of compliance and the persistence 
of consecutive violations, as well as the severity of these.  
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In all, monitoring and enforcement methods have a large effect on compliance. A better 
understanding of both the general effectiveness issues at hand and the nature of the relationship 
in a principal-agent model, including issues of moral hazard and adverse selection, is crucial for 
a well-functioning environmental regulation. Although we are looking at compliance from an 
economic perspective, there are other theoretical foundations that look at factors of deterrence. 
Nyborg (2003), among others, include the aspect of social norms when firms make decisions 
about complying with environmental regulations. In addition, several authors have mentioned 
commitment to social norms, moral reasoning and knowledge of rules and technologies when 
discussing whether firms comply with environmental regulations (See Burby & Paterson, 1993; 
Scholz, 1984). An interesting study on social norms and environmental compliance behavior is 
found in an article by Winter and May (2001). Here, the authors use a logistic regression to 
examine Danish farmers’ compliance to agro-environmental direct regulations. Their findings 
reveal that awareness of rules plays a critical role in compliance. Further, they argue that 
normative and social motivations are as influential as calculated financial motives in avoiding 
violations. The findings from this study concludes that formal monitoring systems with strict 
routines and trust-based inspections can be helpful, while coercion or use of force in monitoring 
methods can have an unfavorable effect (Winter & May, 2001). 
 
It seems evident that there exists contrasting beliefs as to what motivates firms to comply, 
whether it is when the expected penalty is lower than the cost of compliance (Becker, 1968) or 
that firms actually comply at a much higher degree than predicted by rational crime theory 
(Harrington, 1988). Nyborg and Telle argue that, from the Norwegian data on permits, there is 
little evidence to confirm Harrington’s statement about paradoxically high compliance rates. 
However, the authors point out that without the marginal abatement cost, one could only 
hypothesize about the expected effect (Nyborg & Telle, 2006). It could be argued that without 
the actual costs of complying, which neither Harrington nor Nyborg and Telle had data on, the 
studies will have obvious limitations, and provide little empirical evidence. This is the case for 
many studies on compliance with environmental regulations, specifically where command and 
control instruments have been applied. 
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4. METHOD 
In order to investigate those factors that might affect Norwegian firms’ level of compliance to 
pollution permits, this thesis uses three logit models to analyze panel data on firm characteristics 
and monitoring methods used by NEA in the period 1997 - 2011. The logit models will be run on 
different data sets. We will focus on two industries, oil and gas versus land-based industry. Each 
data set will be tested with several model estimations in order to see which variables are 
significant predictors, and to what extent these affect compliance, consecutive violations and the 
severity of the deviations.  
4.1. Data collection and description 
All plant-specific panel data is obtained from NEA. In addition, several data sets have been 
received from Marit Klemetsen at SSB, with the approval of NEA. These refined data sets were 
originally acquired from NEA’s raw data, and have been integrated into the compiled data set. In 
total, the raw data contained over 5000 observations that span 21 years, from 1993 to 2014. In 
order to obtain similar variables for all observations, several of the data sets were merged using 
the plant- and organizational number as the firm identifier. The data includes controls of 
pollution permits for several plants collected over a number of years with firm as the same cross-
sectional unit. The initial data set contained plant number, control year, control type, 
organizational number, number of deviations and remarks as well as monitoring classification. 
The data set was supplemented with the assigned risk class for each firm, monitoring 
classification, and whether the plant belonged to land-based industry or the oil and gas sector. In 
order to get an equal number of observations with the same predictors, the data was merged so 
that no models contain missing values. 
  
Controls performed in the periods 1993-1996 and 2012-2014 are omitted. The first period from 
1993-1996 is removed due to homogeneous data. In this period, only 1 of the 324 controls 
detected and registered firms in non-compliance. The skewed data might be a result of structural 
changes within NEA’s monitoring methods, or because of severe changes in regulation 
requirements. For the period 2012-2014, observations are omitted due to inadequate data from 
NEA. The observations for this recent period are all controls from the offshore industry, and 
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there are only 27 observations. The concern is that the results from this period will give a 
misrepresentation in the analysis, as years and periods are included as explanatory variables. 
They will therefore be excluded. These reductions resulted in the key data set for our analysis, 
which contains 1 602 controls performed at 447 different firms.  
It is evident that we have unbalanced panel data, where the number of observations has not been 
the same for every plant. This entails that although there are observed controls for each plant, the 
number of controls and the interval between these vary between firms. 
4.1.1. Weakness of data 
There are several limitations of substantial impact in the available data. Firstly, controls are not 
conducted on an annual basis, but are rather performed at different intervals depending on 
assigned risk class, chosen focus for the monitoring schedule and other arbitrary judgments made 
by NEA. This leads to an issue with dependencies in the sample due to the unbalanced panel 
data. Since the same firms are controlled over time there can potentially be a correlation between 
the controls performed within the same company, as well as large differences in number of 
observed controls for different firms. Due to these issues, a limited number of controls will also 
be tested, where the selection includes the latest control from each firm, exclusively. In deciding 
how to limit the data to one observation per firm, several methods were considered. Furthermore, 
all data manipulation of this kind means that one has to make some general assumptions. As a 
result the selected method will have some weaknesses. We want to analyze the most recent firm-
behavior, and have therefore decided to include the latest performed control for each firm. It is 
difficult to guarantee that the latest control will give a good representation of any given firm over 
time. Nonetheless, we have to keep the issues of this method in mind during the analysis and 
interpretation of the results. The model estimations for testing the sample ‘latest control’ might 
provide results that are not representative. 
  
Secondly, the available data only includes observations from the land-based industry and oil and 
gas sector. Control results from other industries, such as export and import of waste and waste 
disposal, are not included. Ideally for our analysis, the controls from the oil and gas sector and 
land-based industry are representative for all Norwegian firms, but we have to acknowledge that 
this might not be the case, and that inclusion of controls from other sectors would have given a 
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more complete result. Thereby, we can not generalize based on our results. Further, there are 
fewer firms that operate within the oil and gas sector, leading to a much smaller sample size for 
this data than that for land-based industry, as the number of controls that have been conducted in 
oil and gas are few. 
 
Thirdly, there is the typical issue of missing observations or wrongly reported information. 
Although the assumption is that all variables have been measured accurately, we have to 
acknowledge that in practice there will be some measurement errors in the data. When it comes 
to missing observations, some of our variables were missing information such that the 
observation in question had to be dropped. In certain cases, the variable as a whole had to be 
dropped from the analysis; this was due to the fact that the information was available merely for 
the land-based industry. As we had a small number of variables available initially, this severely 
limited the number of explanatory variables in our analysis. Testing of plant-specific data will be 
performed to analyze these variables. 
  
Lastly, as with any econometric analysis, there is a fundamental issue of including all relevant 
variables and finding a true model is nearly impossible (Phillips, 1986). Due to the lack of 
quantitative information, not unexpectedly, there will be missing variables in our model that 
could be explanatory. It is common experience in empirical analysis that the data we would 
ideally like to include is not available. One of the main issues within the literature on monitoring 
and enforcing firm-level compliance is that many empirical studies lack firms individual 
compliance costs. Our analysis is no exception, and we acknowledge this limitation to our thesis. 
 
Other variables we would have liked to include are firm size, either in terms of number of 
employees or revenue, if the firm has a department or any employee specifically in charge of 
environmental aspects of the business, and knowledge about the level of risk aversion and the 
moral motivation of firms. Because of the difficulty of obtaining information on these variables, 
they are not included in the analysis, despite their assumed relevance in explaining how firms 
react to pollution permits.  
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4.2. Defining the explanatory variables 
Industry 
As we expect there to be substantial differences between the oil and gas sector and land-based 
industry when it comes to compliance to pollution permits we have included industry as an 
explanatory variable to investigate this. The data from NEA has been manipulated such that the 
oil and gas classification includes land-based operational activities such as oil refinement, natural 
gas extraction and construction of oil rigs, whereas these types of activities normally are 
classified as land-based industry. This is partly to give a broader sample for the oil and gas 
sector, and partly because we believe the attention to the environment at these establishments are 
more similar to those of the offshore sector than other land-based industry. The land-based 
industry category contains a variety of different establishments, from road construction, 
maintenance of large ships to waste management and paper production. Land-based industries 
that have the highest potential pollution damage, designated by risk class 1, typically include the 
production of plastic, metal, nickel or aluminum, as well as treatment of chemical waste. 
  
Risk class 
This variable uses NEA’s own classification system for monitoring of firms, which is based on 
the expected pollution threat and industry. The categorical variable contains 4 ranks, from the 
category with the assumed highest risk of polluting in risk class 1, and the least risk of polluting 
in risk class 4. The fine warning levels and monitoring frequency are determined according to 
risk class, as is the price of inspections, which is covered by the firms. The variable can be seen 
as a predictor of expected penalty, as it includes the probability of being monitored and the cost 
if caught. However, we cannot distinguish between the effect of monitoring frequency and level 
of economic sanctions. 
 
Control type 
This variable categorizes the type of control that has been performed, and follows NEA’s own 
categorization of control types that is further presented in section 2.3.3. Monitoring. The four 
categories are inspections, which are performed in one day or less, the extensive system revisions 
that among other things control management systems, emergency inspections and other controls. 
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Monitoring classifications 
In order to create a monitoring schedule, NEA has a classification system that prioritizes controls 
for those firms that have not complied with the pollution permit in the past. The classification is 
based on recommendations from the NEA agent about future control frequency. There are four 
categories that rank monitoring priority, ranging from ‘normal monitoring according to routine’ 
to ‘monitoring with particular priority, consider legal action.’ However, the available data only 
contains two categories: normal monitoring and monitoring with particular priority. There were 
125 controls in the data set where information on this variable was missing; these observations 
are omitted from the analysis. 
  
Number of controlled items 
Initially, this variable was a distinction between the different severities of violations, with each 
control placed in one of four categories: no findings, remarks, deviations or severe deviations. 
The data is categorized based on the most serious offense. The variable cannot be included in the 
analysis as an independent variable to compliance, because it would be a perfect predictor. 
Instead, the variable is included by looking solely at the number of items that were investigated 
during the control, regardless of the result.  
  
Year and periods variable 
The year variable is used as a continuous regressor, from 1997 – 2011. The unbalanced panel 
data is yet again an issue, as there are some firms with multiple controls in the same year, and 
other with none. This can lead to a skewed representation of the firms, especially considering 
that controls are risk-based and firms that are considered to be high-risk are controlled more 
often than other firms. Because there are large differences in the number of observations for the 
year variable, there is some suspicion that the continuous regressor will give an inaccurate 
outcome. By observing the raw data, there is a notable increase in the number of firms caught in 
non-compliance after 2006. The dummy variable period was created, with the two categories 
‘controls undertaken in 2005 or earlier’ and ‘controls performed later than 2005’ to investigate 
this trend. 
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4.3. Descriptive statistics 
The sample of plant-specific monitoring results include 1 602 observations of controls performed 
at 447 different firms. Before undertaking the econometric analysis, it will be interesting to look 
at the outcome variable compliance, as seen from the descriptive statistics. Figure 4.1 illustrate 
the total percentage of all controls that were in compliance from 1997 to 2011. 
 
 
                 Figure 4.1 Percentage of controls that reported compliance 1997 - 2011 
 
From a quick look at the graph, interesting observations are made regarding compliance around 
2005 and 2006. We see a drastic decrease in percentage of firms that were in compliance from 
2005 to 2007. This low percentage persists through 2011, with an average compliance 
percentage in the period between 2006 and 2011 of 18%. By solely looking at the summarized 
data, the best compliance performance was in 2005, where 56% of all controls revealed 
compliance with the pollution permit. In contrast, it is quite alarming that in 2011 alone, 83% of 
all plant-specific controls in the offshore and land-based industry uncovered violations. This 
entails that a majority of the firms with pollution permits were failing to comply with the 
requirements established by law.  
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Table 4.1 Frequency distribution of non-compliance for controls 1997 - 2011 
Data selection Number of        performed controls 
Controls that detected 
non-compliance 
Percentage of controls that 
reported non-compliance 
All controls1 1602 1213 76% 
Latest control2 447 370 83% 
1 All controls performed in both land-based and oil industry 
2 Data selection including only the latest registered control per firm (one control per firm included in selection) 
 
Moreover, as seen in Table 4.1, there is a prevalent problem with poor compliance rates among 
Norwegian firms. From the raw data, it is evident that the as much as 76% of all controls in the 
period 1997 - 2011 detect non-compliance. Nonetheless, we must keep in mind that the non-
compliance rate is calculated based on all performed controls and that suspected offenders are 
monitored more often than other firms. Even considering this, the number of controls that 
detected at least one violation is very high. The high frequency of non-compliance detected in 
controls in this period tells us that most controls found violations, but it does not specify the 
number of deviations per control, nor the severity. Further, it will be interesting to look at the 
severity of the deviation, as well as the occurrence of consecutive violations. 
 
Table 4.2 Frequency distribution of consecutive violations 1997 - 2011 
Data selection Number of        performed controls 
Controls that detected 
consecutive violations 
Percentage of controls that 
reported consecutive 
violations 
All controls1 1602 637 40% 
Latest control2 447 203 45% 
1 All controls performed in both land-based and oil industry 
2 Data selection including only the latest registered control per firm (one control per firm included in selection) 
 
Table 4.2 reports the frequency distribution of consecutive violations performed in 1997 - 2011. 
The raw data reveals that 40% of all controls detect repeated offenses, with two or more 
successive controls reporting violations. 
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From Table 4.3 below, we see that the percentage of controls that reported severe deviations is 
low compared to the overall level of compliance. Here, the raw data reveals that as few as 2% of 
controls detected severe deviations in the complete data set, while 4% of the controls included in 
the sample that includes only one observation per firm found severe deviations. 
 
Table 4.3 Frequency distribution of severe deviations 1997 - 2011 
Data selection Number of        performed controls 
Controls that detected 
severe deviations 
Percentage of controls that 
reported severe deviations 
All controls1 1602 32 2% 
Latest control2 447 17 4% 
1 All controls performed in both land-based and oil industry 
2 Data selection including only the latest registered control per firm (one control per firm included in selection) 
 
Further, due to the difference in environmental risk related to the nature of operations in land-
based industry and the oil and gas sector, we are interested in examining the distribution of firms 
in the two industries across risk classes. 
 
Table 4.4 Industry-specific frequency distribution of controls by risk class 
 
Risk class 1 Risk class 2 Risk class 3 Risk class 4 Total 
Oil and gas sector 108 5 2 0 115 
Land-based industry 495 417 505 70 1487 
 
As seen in Table 4.4, firms in the oil and gas sector are rather homogeneous when it comes to 
risk class, as almost 94% of the firms are placed in risk class 1. This issue of homogeneity is due 
to NEA’s risk-based monitoring and enforcement system, where the level of environmental 
impact is considered when firms are assigned to the different risk classes. Due to the issue of 
homogeneity within the industry, we will not look at model estimations for oil and gas 
separately. The controlled firms in land-based industry are more evenly distributed between risk 
class 1 - 3, though few firms in risk class 4 have been controlled. 
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We are also interested in looking at the distribution of the different control types used in the 
period 1997 - 2011. In Figure 4.2, we see that inspections is the most performed control type 
throughout the period, and more than 60% of all controls in the period 2004 - 2011 have been 
inspections. System revisions is the second most used control, and between 20 and 30% of all 
controls have been system revisions in the period. Lastly, we notice that there have been fewer 
emergency inspections and other controls in the period 2004 - 2011.  
 
 
   Figure 4.2 Percentage-wise distribution of control types 1997 - 2011 
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Before the econometric models used in the analysis are presented, a detailed description of all included 
variables can be seen in Table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.5 Description of variables 
Variables Number of observations 
Variable 
name^ Description Mean 
Dependent variables     
Compliance  COM Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if the control does not reveal 
deviations, 0 otherwise. 
0.24 
Consecutive violations  CON Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if there have been deviations in 
two or more controls in a row, 0 otherwise. 
0.40 
Severe deviations  SEV Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if the control reports severe 
deviation, 0 otherwise. 
0.02 
Firm characteristics 
    
Oil and gas sector * 115    
Land-based industry 1487 IND Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if the firm operates in land-
based industry, 0 if the firm belongs in the oil and 
gas sector 
0.93 
Risk class 1 * 603  Reference category, high-risk firms.  
Risk class 2 422 RC2 Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if medium-risk firm, 0 
otherwise. 
0.26 
Risk class 3 507 RC3 Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if low-risk firm, 0 otherwise. 0.32 
Risk class 4 70 RC4 Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if lowest-risk firm, 0 otherwise. 0.04 
Monitoring methods 
    
Inspections * 1010    
System revisions 393 CT2 Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if the control is a system 
revision, 0 otherwise. 
0.25 
Emergency inspections 111 CT3 Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if the control is an emergency 
inspection, 0 otherwise. 
0.07 
Other controls 88 CT4 Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if the control falls in the 
category other controls, 0 otherwise. 
0.06 
Particular priority *     
Normal monitoring  MON Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if the firm is controlled 
according to routine, 0 otherwise. 
0.90 
1 – 5 controlled items *     
6 – 10 controlled items  NC2 Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if 6 - 10 items were controlled, 
0 otherwise. 
0.30 
10+ controlled items  NC3 Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if 10 items or more were 
controlled, 0 otherwise. 
0.20 
Time period 
    
Year  YR The year the control is performed in, continuous 
1997 – 2011.  
2004.6
7 
1997 – 2005 * 857    
2006 – 2011 745 PER Dummy (0 – 1), 1 if the control is performed in 
the period 2005 – 2011, 0 otherwise. 
0.47 
* Reference category 
^ Variable name used in the econometric models  
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4.4. Econometric models 
The binary dependent variables compliance, consecutive violations and severe deviations are 
estimated by the use of logit models, as seen in (1), (2) and (3) respectively. The chosen logit 
models use maximum likelihood in estimating the parameters. 
4.4.1. Model 1: Level of compliance 
When performing controls, NEA registers findings as remarks, deviations or severe deviations. 
Remarks are not infringements of the law, but rather comments of areas of caution. The 
compliance variable is defined based on the most serious violation of the control, such that a 
control that uncover twelve remarks and one severe deviation, will be categorized as severe 
deviation. This is done as we are interested in looking at firms that are in complete compliance 
with the issued pollution permit, meaning that the performed controls detect no deviations. For 
this reason, deviations and severe deviations are considered violations, and result in non-
compliance. Controls with remarks are considered to be in compliance with the pollution permit, 
along with controls without any findings. The logit model for compliance is specified in (1). 
 
(1)  𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑐𝑓 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑅𝑐𝑓 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑐𝑓 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑓2 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑓3 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑓4 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑇𝑐𝑓2 +  𝛽7𝐶𝑇𝑐𝑓3 +
                                𝛽8𝐶𝑇𝑐𝑓
4 + 𝛽9𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑐 + 𝛽10𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑐𝑓 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑂𝐶𝑐𝑓
2 + 𝛽12𝑁𝑂𝐶𝑐𝑓
3 + 𝜀𝑐𝑓 
 
Where COM = (0, 1) is equal to 1 if control c at firm f reported compliance, equal to 0 otherwise. 
The included variables are the continuous year, dummies for risk class, control type, period, 
monitoring classification and number of items checked during a control, and the random error 
term 𝜀𝑐𝑓. For descriptions of the explanatory variables, see table 4.5. 
4.4.2. Model 2: Consecutive violations 
To investigate how firms respond in a dynamic setting, this dependent variable is created to 
investigate consecutive violations. The initial intention was to detect whether or not firms take 
action to correct deviations that have been registered by the NEA. Firms with consecutive 
violations are defined as firms where two or more controls in a row to detect a violation. The 
logit model for consecutive violations is specified in (2). 
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(2)  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑐𝑓 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑅𝑐𝑓 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑐𝑓 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑓2 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑓3 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑓4 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑇𝑐𝑓2 +  𝛽7𝐶𝑇𝑐𝑓3 +
                               𝛽8𝐶𝑇𝑐𝑓
4 + 𝛽9𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑐 + 𝛽10𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑐𝑓 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑂𝐶𝑐𝑓
2 + 𝛽12𝑁𝑂𝐶𝑐𝑓
3 + 𝜀𝑐𝑓 
 
Where CON = (0, 1) is equal to 1 if control c at firm f is the second or more in a row to report 
violations, equal to 0 otherwise. The included variables are the continuous year, dummies for 
risk class, control type, period, monitoring classification and number of items checked during a 
control, and the random error term 𝜀𝑐𝑓. For descriptions of the explanatory variables, see table 
4.5. 
4.4.3. Model 3: Severe deviations 
Severe deviations are violations that by NEA are deemed as particularly serious breaches of the 
pollution permit, and entail increased monitoring, larger fines and the risk of being reported to 
the police for investigation. The logit model for severe deviations is specified in (3):  
  
(3) 𝑆𝐸𝑉𝑐𝑓 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑅𝑐𝑓 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑐𝑓 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑓2 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑓3 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑓4 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑇𝑐𝑓2 +  𝛽7𝐶𝑇𝑐𝑓3 +
                             𝛽8𝐶𝑇𝑐𝑓
4 + 𝛽9𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑐 + 𝛽10𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑐𝑓 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑂𝐶𝑐𝑓
2 + 𝛽12𝑁𝑂𝐶𝑐𝑓
3 + 𝜀𝑐𝑓 
 
Where SEV = (0, 1) is equal to 1 if control c at firm f detects severe deviations, equal to 0 
otherwise. The included variables are the continuous year, dummies for risk class, control type, 
period, monitoring classification and number of items checked during a control, and the random 
error term 𝜀𝑐𝑓. For descriptions of the explanatory variables, see table 4.5.  
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In order to address the hypotheses stated in Section 1.1, we will be looking at the three models 
with compliance, consecutive violations and severity as the dependent variable. In Table 5.1 
below, the expected signs of the variables are presented, according to the postulated hypotheses.  
 
Table 5.1 Expected signs 
Hypotheses Variable Model 1: Compliance 
Model 2: 
Consecutive 
violations 
Model 3: 
Severe 
deviations 
Firm characteristics 
 Expected 
sign 
Expected 
sign 
Expected 
sign 
H1a: Oil and gas less compliant Land-based industry +   
H1b: More consecutive violations in oil and gas Land-based industry  -  
H1c: More serious breaches in oil and gas  Land-based industry   - 
H2a: Less compliance in risk class 1 Risk class 2 – 4  +   
H2b: Less repeated offenders in low-risk firms Risk class 3 & 4  -  
H2c: Less severe deviations in low-risk firms Risk class 3 & 4   - 
Monitoring methods     
H3a: System revisions find more violations System revisions -   
H3b: Emergency controls find more violations Emergency controls -   
H3c: Other controls find more compliance Other controls +   
H3d: More items controlled find more violations 6 – 10, 10+ -   
H3e: Particular monitoring leads to compliance Normal monitoring -   
Time period     
H4a: Compliance increase as technology 
improves 
Year +   
H4b: Compliance decrease after the financial 
crisis 
2006 – 2011  -   
H4c: More repeated offenders after 2005 2006 – 2011   +  
Note: For a detailed description of risk classes, see Table 4.1.    
 
Before we proceed with the regression result, it will be important to establish whether or not 
there is a strong correlation between the variables in the data. As seen from the correlation 
matrix in Appendix 1, there is, not surprisingly, a high correlation between the variables year and 
period. This will not present any problems for our analysis, as these will not be included in the 
same regression.  
 
Several logit model estimations will be tested for each model. These are denoted A through H, 
where A - D tests the complete data set, while E and F excludes all observations for oil and gas, 
resulting in a sample for ‘land-based industry’.  
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The last two model estimations, G and H, are solely tested on the restricted sample ‘latest 
control’. In this sample, only the latest control for each firm is included, such that the data set 
consists of one observations per firm. We must keep in mind that the data selection for these two 
estimations might give a skewed representation of actual compliance since the outcome of the 
last observed control can give a misleading representation of the series of controls.  
5.1. Model 1: Compliance  
The first model investigates factors associated with the probability of being in compliance with 
pollution permits. The regression analysis results are reported for several logit model estimations 
for Model 1, denoted 1A through 1H. 
 
As seen in Table 5.2, we find that most included variables are significant at the 95% level or 
higher in the model estimations for the complete data set (1A – 1D) and the data selection from 
land-based industry (1E – 1F). The year variable is the exception, which is only significant in 1E. 
Additionally, we confirm the assumed weaknesses in the results from the model estimations 
‘latest control’, as discussed in Section 4.1.1 Weakness of data, with only two significant 
variables in each estimation. Here, in 1G and 1H we also note high standard errors for the 
significant variables risk class 3 and system revisions. This leads us to believe that we can place 
little reliability on the results of this estimated model and that we cannot draw any conclusions 
based on this sample. 
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Table 5.2 Regression results for Model 1: Compliance 
 Complete data set Land-based industry Latest control  (One obs. per firm) 
Explanatory 
variables 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 1G 1H 
Industry         
   Land-based 
industry 
-0.821*** 
(0.239) 
 -0.886*** 
(0.240) 
   -0.686 
(0.632) 
-0.702 
(0.634) 
Risk class         
   Risk class 2 -0.675*** 
(0.165) 
-0.793*** 
(0.150) 
-0.644*** 
(0.165) 
-0.768*** 
(0.160) 
-0.578*** 
(0.173) 
-0.547*** 
(0.174) 
-0.748 
(0.459) 
-0.754 
(0.459) 
   Risk class 3 -1.338*** 
(0.367) 
-1.457*** 
(0.172) 
-1.299*** 
(0.175) 
-1.422*** 
(0.171) 
-1.266*** 
(0.184) 
-1.246*** 
(0.183) 
-1.241*** 
(0.442) 
-1.283*** 
(0.440) 
   Risk class 4 -1.335*** 
(0.259) 
-1.456*** 
(0.355) 
-1.311*** 
(0.356) 
-1.432*** 
(0.353) 
-1.338*** 
(0.362) 
-1.360*** 
(0.362) 
-0.901 
(0.564) 
-1.019 
(0.569) 
Control type         
   System 
revisions 
-1.258*** 
(0.181) 
-1.118*** 
(0.171) 
-1.250*** 
(0.181) 
-1.099*** 
(0.170) 
-1.345*** 
(0.216) 
-1.340*** 
(0.216) 
-2.091*** 
(0.538) 
-2.108*** 
(0.538) 
   Emergency 
inspections 
-1.951*** 
(0.367) 
-1.947*** 
(0.366) 
-2.012*** 
(0.367) 
-2.007*** 
(0.366) 
-1.755*** 
(0.393) 
-1.852*** 
(0.391) 
-1.309 
(1.093) 
-1.465 
(1.098) 
   Other 
controls 
1.538*** 
(0.258) 
1.504*** 
(0.259) 
1.464*** 
(0.260) 
1.427*** 
(0.261) 
1.142*** 
(0.280) 
0.994*** 
(0.285) 
1.032 
(0.752) 
1.061 
(0.755) 
Year -0.237 
(0.015) 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
  -0.076*** 
(0.018) 
 -0.023 
(0.049) 
 
Periods         
   2006 – 2011    -0.467** 
(0.134) 
-0.397** 
(0.131) 
 -0.976*** 
(0.166) 
 -0.615 
(0.416) 
Monitoring 
classification 
        
   Normal     2.125*** 
(0.477) 
2.106*** 
(0.476) 
  
Items 
controlled 
        
   5 – 10     -0.582*** 
(0.176) 
-0.657*** 
(0.176) 
  
   10+     -0.906*** 
(0.225) 
-1.056** 
(0.220) 
  
N 1602 1602 1602 1602 1487 1487 447 447 
Log 
likelihood -777.66 -783.45 -772.83 -779.50 -669.71 -660.67 -192.41 -191.48 
LR chi2 (7) 222.69 169.01 230.34 217.01 273.97 185.77 25.94 27.78 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.123 0.095 0.130 0.122 0.170 0.115 0.063 0.068 
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable: 1 = control found compliance, 0 = control detected violations. 
Reference categories: Oil and gas sector, risk class 1, inspections, 1997 - 2005, particular priority, 0 - 5 items.  
See table 5.1. for more details on the variables. 
 
 43 
5.1.1. Hypotheses on firm characteristics  
 
Industry  
Hypothesis H1a: Oil and gas less compliant states that firms in the land-based industry are more 
likely to be in compliance with pollution permits than those in the oil and gas sector. According 
to the regression results presented in Table 5.2, we have found evidence to refute this hypothesis. 
Although the coefficients for the dummy variable industry are not statistically significant in 1G 
and 1H, they are statistically significant at the 99% level in 1A and 1C. Here, the coefficient for 
land-based industry has a negative sign in both estimations. This indicates a reduced probability 
of complying to the pollution permit for firms in the land-based industry, as opposed to those in 
oil and gas. Although the coefficient for land-based industry is not statistically significant in 
‘latest control’, we consider the results from the complete data set to be more reliable due to the 
previously discussed issues with model 1G and 1H. Thus, we base our rejection of H1a on the 
findings from the complete data set. 
 
A possible explanation to why there is a greater probability of compliance in the oil and gas 
sector, as opposed to what was postulated in H1a, may be the perceived risk of detection. All 
firms in the offshore sector are placed in risk class 1. NEA’s monitoring schedule suggests that 
these firms are subject to greater control-frequency with one inspection every year, and system 
revisions every third year. This leads us to think that compliance is greater by regulated agents 
that think there is a stronger likelihood of violations being detected. The notion that firms within 
the oil and gas sector have a greater probability of complying than expected can be supported by 
previous studies (see Burby & Paterson, 1993; Gray & Scholz, 1991). Here, the authors have 
done empirical studies on enforcement of environmental regulations and state that the expected 
risk of being caught in non-compliance is more important in shaping lawful behavior than the 
likelihood and severity of sanctions. These claims can suggest that firms in oil and gas comply 
more because there is an increased risk of being caught due to greater thoroughness of controls 
and an increased monitoring frequency. 
 
To further support our findings, Cohen (1987) found in his study on oil spills in the US that even 
if the penalty were to remain unchanged, the principal, in his case the Coast Guard, may be able 
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to achieve more compliance by shifting enforcement efforts into more detailed port patrols, or by 
directly monitoring the oil transfers at platforms. Cohen’s results may give some support to our 
finding that firms in oil and gas are more likely to comply because they are placed in a risk class 
where they are under more scrutiny from NEA. 
 
Another feasible argument that supports the rejection of our hypothesis, H1a: Oil and gas less 
compliant is the financial capacity and priorities of the firms. Here, one can assume that firms in 
the offshore industry have a better ability to comply with regulations because of available 
resources. Although we lack data on firm size, and this could be an important factor that affects 
compliance, we can assume that oil and gas is a capital-intensive sector. Hence, the assumption 
can be made that firms in this sector has a greater capacity to comply since firms of their size are 
likely to have a compliance and risk management department, indicating that internal risk 
measures may be a part of every-day operations. This also entail that they are more likely to have 
more detailed knowledge of the pollution control act versus firms in land-based industry, which 
may include small “mom and pop” firms that might have one employee in charge of health, 
safety and environment (HSE). Because the risk of being caught is higher, and the potential 
economic consequences of being in non-compliance could be especially high, firms in oil and 
gas have a an incentive to act with some risk-aversiveness. Here, a breach with the law, or even 
suspicion of a leak or spill, could lead to a halt in the production process, which could be of an 
immense effect on the profit margin. The oil and gas sector also face larger economic 
consequences as fine levels and cost of inspections are higher for firms in risk class 1. Combined 
with a higher frequency of controls if caught with violations, the cost of the inspection is another 
economic consequence to consider. Consequently, offshore plants in risk class 1 face higher 
possible sanctions in case of criminal prosecution.  
 
The consequences of being in non-compliance, or even a potential oil spill, is not limited to 
economic and legal ramifications, it could also entail a drastic loss of reputation. In their article, 
Roberts and Dowling (2002) state that firms that are performing well financially have a much 
greater chance at sustaining the economic performance in the long run if they maintain a good 
reputation. Combining the oil and gas sector’s already tainted reputation with the higher 
associated risk of accidents that can cause detrimental damage to the environment, one can 
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assume that the loss of reputation would be greater for oil and gas firms, leading them adopt 
more precautionary measures to limit the risk of bad publicity. 
 
As previously discussed, we have not been able to gather information on the marginal abatement 
costs of the controlled firms. This has to be considered a crucial limitation in our data, as we are 
not able to distinguish at what level the expected penalty surpasses the abatement costs. 
Although we must reject H1a, it seems evident that the oil and gas sector act with some risk- 
precaution, and this might explain why their compliance is higher than what we expected. 
 
Risk class  
We postulate in H2a: Less compliance in risk class 1 that firms in the lower risk classes are more 
likely to be in compliance than firms in risk class 1. Our results show that firm-assigned risk 
classes for compliance are substantively and statistically noteworthy at the 95% level or higher 
for all models in the complete data set, as well as the data from land-based industry exclusively. 
Risk class 3 is also significant in 1G and 1H. The estimated coefficients for the effect of risk 
class indicate that there is a negative relationship for the dummy variables risk class 2, 3 and 4. 
Here, it is evident that all firms classified with smaller threat of pollution are less likely to be in 
compliance than the strictest classification and reference group, risk class 1. This refutes our 
hypothesis H2a, that the firms that pose the greatest environmental threat has a higher tendency 
to violate the designated pollution permits, compared to lower-risk firms.  
 
There might be many reasons for these findings, which corresponds with the rejection of H1a: 
Oil and gas less compliant. Again, it might be explained by previous research, here Bye and 
Klemetsen (2014) suggests that firms in high risk classes are more sensitive to threats of 
penalties and fines, and thus have a greater incentive to comply. In similarity with research by 
Telle and Nyborg (2006), we have also found the enforcement system for minor violations to be 
lax, with fine warnings, in the form of a letter, as the standard response. The sensitivity to threats 
of sanctions might contribute to the explanation to why our results find that firms in high-risk 
classes have a lower tendency to violate regulations.  
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According to Becker’s model (1968) one would assume that firms speculate in breaching the law 
if the expected penalty is lower than the compliance cost, and breaking the law because paying 
the fines will be beneficial compared to investing to comply. We do not intend to claim that low-
risk firms speculate in breaking the law, and we find no sound evidence to support Becker's 
notion as we have no data on individual compliance expenditure. However, an argument can be 
made that the variable for risk class include a portion of a firm's expected penalty, as both 
monitoring frequency and economic fines are decided in accordance to risk class. Although the 
costs of inspections are considered marginally low for firms in the upper risk classes, the 
perceived risk of formal accusations and prosecution is present. This might indicate that the 
marginal damage to high-risk firms is greater even when it is not financially explicit, but comes 
in the form of a damaged reputation if violations were made public and the expected threat of 
harsh criminal penalties.  
 
As for the industry variable, we could have performed a more detailed analysis had information 
on abatement costs been available. It would also have been interesting to compare the expected 
penalty to the revenue of the different firms, as the implications of a set fine differ for firms with 
different incomes and thereby ability to pay. 
 
According to the results for model estimations 1A through 1F, a rejection of H2a indicates that 
risk class 3 and 4 have a negative impact on firms’ compliance to pollution permits compared to 
firms in risk class 1. According to NEA’s baseline for monitoring frequency, presented in Table 
2.3, firms in risk class 3 are scheduled for an inspection every second or third year, and are not 
scheduled for system revisions, while firms in risk class 4 are only scheduled for inspections 
when needed. As the low-risk firms are subject to the least frequent monitoring, this contradicts 
the notion of Harrington paradox that there should still be an abundance of compliance among 
these firms. 
5.1.2. Hypotheses on monitoring methods  
Control type  
According to the regression results, control type is a relevant predictor in explaining firms' 
compliance with permits. The dummy variable for system revisions is significant at the 99% 
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level with a negative sign for all model estimations, including 1G and 1H; ‘latest control’. This 
corresponds with our expectation in H3a: System revisions find more violations, thus we cannot 
reject our hypothesis that system revisions has a greater impact on non-compliance than the 
reference group, inspections. System revisions are longer-lasting controls that monitor the 
environmental management system as well as the internal control system at the controlled entity. 
Further, the firm will be inspected in greater detail, indicating that the thoroughness of the 
control will leave little leeway to the firm. Thus, it will be more difficult for the firm to hide its 
actions or engage in a “manipulative behavior” during system revisions. According to NEA’s 
pre-determined plan for monitoring frequency, presented in Table 2.3, system revisions are only 
performed at firms placed in the two highest risk classes.  
 
After refuting H2a: Less compliance in risk class 1, where firms in risk class 1 proved to have a 
positive impact on compliance because the expected risk of detection is larger, we see a similar 
indication for H3a. Because system revisions are more likely to uncover violations than 
inspections, the higher level of compliance in risk class 1 can be interpreted as a result of the 
frequent use of system revisions when controlling firms in this risk class. This monitoring 
method induces firms to comply because there is greater transparency concerning their behavior. 
 
Further, after failing to reject H3a: System revisions find more violations, and correspondingly 
refuting H2a, our findings can be supported by previous studies. According to Heyes, more 
thorough inspections provide firms with incentives to switch to more transparent technologies, 
which in return can lead to a greater detection-rate and avoidance of type II errors. Entire internal 
systems and procedures are difficult to manipulate with the intent to keep information from the 
controlling authorities, and decreases the chance of wrongful control results. Here, Heyes claims 
that better thoroughness will lead to a higher detection rate, implying that it will be more difficult 
for firms to conceal violations during a more extensive control. (Heyes, 1994; 1998).  
 
We find that low risk classes, which are mainly monitored through inspections, have a higher 
tendency to violate the permit. Thereby, we can argue that thoroughness of controls is more 
important than monitoring frequency in detecting violations. Here, Heyes (1994) confirm our 
belief that a sole increase in frequency of controls might, in fact, lead firms to move in the other 
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direction, away from transparency, causing worse environmental performance over time. 
Consequently, these shorter but more frequent inspections, will be more superficial by nature and 
can make it possible for firms to conceal their actions.  
 
Further, system revisions are always announced. Inspections are less extensive, and according to 
Orvik at NEA (2015), around 40% of these are unannounced. It would have been interesting to 
investigate the difference in control results between the announced and unannounced inspections. 
We would postulate that the unannounced inspections uncovered more violations by catching 
firms off-guard, but unfortunately, there is no data available on the distinction, making an 
analysis of this impossible.  
 
We would also like to examine the less frequently used monitoring methods, namely ‘emergency 
inspections’ and ‘other controls’. These are both significant at the 99% level in six of the eight 
model estimations. However, the variables are not significant in the two model estimations 1G 
and 1H. As previously discussed, this issue is of little importance due to the unrepresentative and 
random selection of data included in ‘latest control’. The coefficient for ‘emergency inspections’ 
has a negative sign in all model estimations 1A - 1F, indicating that emergency inspections 
decreases the likelihood of compliance, meaning we cannot reject our hypothesis. This is not 
very surprising, as the controls are performed in cases of accidents like oil spills or on the basis 
of reported suspicion, such as unlawful dumping of hazardous waste.  
 
When it comes to the category ‘other controls’, such as letter controls, random sample tests, 
source-specific emission measurements, the coefficients in model estimations 1D and 1E has a 
positive effect. Our postulation H3c: Other controls find more compliance states that controls 
that fall in this category detect violations at a lower rate than inspections, and cannot be rejected. 
These controls are performed less often than inspections and system revisions, and are more 
superficial by nature. According to the NEA the intent behind these controls is not necessarily to 
uncover violations, but to execute some authoritative presence, create dialog and a basis for a 
good relationship and collaboration. (NEA; Orvik, 2015). One could assume that this regulatory 
presence might function as a reminder to firms that there is a chance of unannounced inspections. 
In a study performed by Kjetil Telle at SSB in collaboration with NEA, they found that issued 
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letter controls in fact contributed to improve the level of compliance overall in product control, 
and that firms respond to these letters by correcting violations (NEA; Orvik, 2015). Although 
this study was performed in a different sector, it is reasonable to assume that the effect might be 
similar in land-based industry and the oil and gas sector.  
 
Number of items inspected  
Another factor we have included when examining the effect of NEA’s monitoring methods, is 
the number of items inspected during a control. In accordance with H3a: System revisions find 
more violations, we postulate in H3d: More items controlled find more violations that more than 
5 items is likely to have a negative impact on compliance. This hypothesis is tested in 1E and 1F, 
as the data for this variable is only available for land-based industry. Due to this limitation in the 
data, the results may not be representable for other industries.  
 
The dummy variables for 5 - 10 items and 10+ items controlled are both significant in 1E and 1F 
at the 95% level or higher. All four coefficients are negative, meaning that we cannot reject H3d 
that controls with more than 5 items have negative impact on compliance compared to controls 
that check 1-5 items. Again, this is in agreement with our findings concerning H3a that system 
revisions seem to uncover non-compliance at a higher rate than inspections, and that the 
detection rate increases with the thoroughness of the monitoring method. Further, an argument 
can be made that the more items controlled can contribute to decrease the issue of moral hazard, 
as NEA through these controls gain more extensive information about the controlled firm and 
their activities. The issue of asymmetric information seems to decrease as both number of items 
inspected and thoroughness increase, as seen in both H3a and H3d.  
 
Monitoring classification  
Of further interest is NEA’s monitoring methods that include previous behavior. Of particular 
interest is the firms whose prior control revealed deviations such that the recommendation 
resulted in “control more frequently”, denoted as particular priority. Information on monitoring 
categorization is only available for the sample ‘land-based industry’ and will thereby be tested in 
1E and 1F. The dummy variable for normal monitoring is significant with a positive sign at the 
99% in both model estimations, meaning that controls of firms under normal monitoring are 
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more likely to positively affect compliance, than the reference category particular priority. 
According to Harrington (1988) and Scholz (1984), the regulator may increase overall 
compliance rates by targeting those who have been repeated offenders. On the basis of these 
theoretical models, we postulate in H3e: Particular monitoring leads to compliance that firms 
that are monitored under the classification particular priority are more likely to comply with the 
permits in the succeeding control. According to the model estimations 1E and 1F, the hypothesis 
has to be rejected.  
 
The rejection of H3e can be explained by the fact that firms under ‘particular monitoring’ are 
subject to more frequent and thorough controls than firms under ‘normal monitoring’, hence 
violations are detected more often. However, firms that are placed in the category for monitoring 
of particular priority, are not informed of this. This present an issue of asymmetric information, 
where the regulator intentionally withholds information from the controlled firm. In accordance 
with principal-agent theory, it can be assumed that firms would adjust their behavior if they were 
made aware of the increased monitoring priority.  
 
Based on our postulation, and according to Harrington (1988) and Scholz’s (1984) claims that 
compliance increases as previous offenders are especially monitored, our results are somewhat 
surprising. Moreover, there seems to be a dichotomous relationship between the level of 
enforcement and rate of compliance. This is supported by Deily and Gray in their study of 
compliance with air pollution regulations at steel plants in the U.S, and the enforcement of these. 
The authors claim that higher level of enforcement encourage higher level of compliance, while 
higher levels of compliance will again lead to lower levels of monitoring by the NEA (Gray & 
Deily, 1996). This classification is a perfect example of the typical causality dilemma of “the 
chicken or the egg”. Here, it is difficult to determine if the observed effect is based on firms 
being placed in the category due to non-compliance, or being in non-compliance because they 
are placed under monitoring of particular priority. Hence, contributing toward a continuous cycle 
of adjustments in enforcement level, making the task of deciding monitoring intensity difficult.  
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5.1.3. Hypotheses on year and period  
When analyzing the effect of year and period on compliance, we must remember that we are 
working with unbalanced panel data. Here, the NEA consider its monitoring schedule based on 
potential risk and level of environmental damage when deciding how often to control firms. In 
terms of the data sample ‘latest control’, the latest observation for each firm will be registered in 
different years, such that the control might be performed under varying circumstances 
concerning economic environment, monitoring methods and regulatory demands. Thereby, the 
results from these estimations should be interpreted with care.  
 
Due to the high correlation between year and period, the two variables are not included in the 
same regression, but rather tested in four model estimations each. Year is significant at the 99% 
level in 1E that tests data from land-based industry, but not significant in any of the other model 
estimations, indicating that the variable may be significant only under certain conditions. Our 
expectation in H4a: Compliance increase as technology improves was that the increased 
environmental pressure, combined with a decrease in marginal abatement cost over time due to 
better technology, would lead to more compliance in later years. The regression results refute 
this hypothesis, as the variable year has a negative effect on compliance. However, we must keep 
in mind that the variable is not significant in the model estimations 1A, 1B and 1G, and the 
reliability of this result is questionable. 
 
In H4b: Compliance decrease after financial crisis, we postulate that the period after 2005 has a 
negative effect on compliance compared to the period 1997 - 2005. Although we assumed more 
compliance as technology improves, presumably leading to a decrease in marginal abatement 
costs, as most economic literature suggests, it is plausible to assume that fluctuations in the 
economy will affect firms ability to comply. Consequently, it may seem as though H4a: 
Compliance increase as technology improves and H4b: Compliance decrease after financial 
crisis are somewhat contradictory. Here, we distinguish between the aggregate compliance effect 
over a period of 14 years and the short-term effect of the period after 2005. Ideally, we would 
have data that span over a longer time period, which could potentially have illustrated the effect 
in a better manner, and led to a different outcome of hypothesis H4a. This is supported by what 
we observe in Figure 4.1, where the percentage of compliance in the period 1997 - 2011 is 
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displayed. Here, we see some variations in the percentage of compliance from 1997 to 2005, but 
the underlying trend is an increase in compliance in this period.  
 
Based on the descriptive statistics from the raw data in Figure 4.1, we hypothesized that the 
period after 2005 may have a negative effect on compliance, as a result of an early onset of the 
financial crisis of 2008. The variable period is significant in three of the four model estimations 
at the 95% level or higher with a negative sign. This means that we cannot reject our hypothesis 
H5b; that firms are more likely to be in non-compliance in the period after the early onset of the 
financial crisis, by our definition 2006 - 2011. Thus, this indicates that the period after 2005 have 
had a negative impact on compliance. According to Becker (1968), the expected penalty for non-
compliance is considered equal to other business expenses faced by the firm. Here, one could 
argue that firms would comply in order to avoid the penalty expense. However, when looking at 
a profit-maximizing firm, environmental efforts may be at the bottom of the list of priorities in 
periods of economic downturns. 
 
Further supporting our finding, Laffont (1995) examines the potential issues of moral hazard 
when a firm is faced with direct environmental regulations. He argues that regulatory demands, 
combined with the competition from other firms, induce a greater focus on cost-minimization, 
and that this might lead to a “trade-off” where the agent is forced to take more risk. In times of 
economic downturns, one could argue that the pressure to retain customers, and keep on-time 
delivery according to contract, is especially great since the consequence of losing business is 
particularly large and can potentially lead to bankruptcy. The two possible outcomes in such 
instances might be to violate the permit, in order to reach production target, or possibly face an 
increased marginal abatement cost since technology investments probably will not be prioritized 
when costs are minimized (Laffont, 1995). Although we see a negative effect of the period after 
2005 on compliance, we can only suggest that the financial crisis was the sole reason for this.  It 
is worth noting though, that there are many other factors that could have led to the decrease in 
compliance during this period, such as changes in monitoring methods, regulatory environment 
or increased funding to the NEA. 
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To summarize the findings in Model 1, most variables were statistically significant at the 95% 
level or higher, for all models. We can see from Table 5.3 that three of the hypotheses were 
rejected. Additionally, we keep in mind that the results from H4a regarding year only found 
weak evidence to reject.  
 
Table 5.3 Findings of expected signs for Model 1: Compliance 
Hypotheses Variable Expected sign Reject? 
Firm characteristics    
H1a: Oil and gas less compliant Land-based industry 
+ Yes 
H2a: Less compliance in risk class 1 Risk class 2 – 4  + Yes 
    
Monitoring methods    
H3a: System revisions find more violations System revisions - No 
H3b: Emergency controls find more violations Emergency controls 
- No 
H3c: Other controls find more compliance Other controls + No 
H3d: More items controlled find more violations 6 – 10, 10+ - No 
H3e: Particular monitoring leads to compliance Normal monitoring - Yes 
    
Time period    
H4a: Compliance increase as technology improves Year + ? 
H4b: Compliance decrease after the financial crisis 2006 – 2011  - No 
For a detailed description of risk classes, see Table 4.1.  
Yes denotes that the null hypothesis is rejected. No denotes that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
5.2. Model 2: Consecutive violations 
So far, we have focused on compliance as the dependent outcome. In order to eliminate the 
chance of one-time offenses, we are interested in examining those firms who repeatedly are 
caught violating the permit, and consequently which factors contribute to notorious breaches of 
the law. We therefore proceed by analyzing the probability of having consecutive violations in 
subsequent controls. Here, we acknowledge the chance that the following control actually 
examines different criteria within the permit than the preceding, and that the original violations 
have indeed been corrected. This indicates that a firm caught with deviations to the permit on 
internal auditing routines in one control, can in the next control be caught with incorrect 
treatment of hazardous waste. These differences are hard to separate since NEA might perform 
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“themed” controls, where there is one area of focus across all plants that are monitored that year, 
and these might differ each year.  
 
While taking this into account, we will investigate the dependent variable consecutive, where a 
firm is considered to have consecutive violations if two or more controls in a row reveal 
deviations. Table 5.4 reports the regression results for the logit model, using the same set of 
variables as in Model 1. Each separate model estimation is denoted 2A through 2H, where 2A - 
2D tests the complete data set, 2E and 2F test the data set for ‘land-based industry’ and 2G and 
2H tests the sample ‘latest control’. 
 
In the model estimations for consecutive violations displayed in Table 5.4, control type appears 
to be an important factor in predicting consecutive violations, while risk class seems to have less 
predictive power. We again confirm the assumed weaknesses in the results from model 
estimations 2G and 2H, testing the data sample ‘latest control’. In 2G, year and industry are the 
only significant variables, and industry is only significant at the 90% level with a rather high 
standard error. In 2H, industry is significant at the 90% level, again with a high standard error, 
and period is significant at the 99% level. We suspect that the year and period variable pick up 
effects from other factors that are not included in the model, and thereby is weighted too heavily. 
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Table 5.4 Regression results for Model 2: Consecutive violations 
 Complete data set Land-based industry Latest control  (One obs. per firm) 
Explanatory 
variables 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 2G 2H 
Industry         
   Land-based 
industry 
1.287*** 
(0.251) 
 1.233*** 
(0.250) 
   0.938* 
(0.502) 
0.956* 
(0.501) 
Risk class         
   Risk class 2 0.916 
(0.142) 
0.289** 
(0.137) 
0.133 
(0.140) 
0.317** 
(0.136) 
0.016 
(0.146) 
0.076 
(0.144) 
0.143 
(0.350) 
0.111 
(0.349) 
   Risk class 3 -0.171 
(0.146) 
0.026 
(0.142) 
-0.106 
(0.146) 
 0.076 
(0.171) 
-0.262* 
(0.150) 
-0.165 
(0.148) 
-0.248 
(0.343) 
-0.251 
(0.342) 
   Risk class 4 -0.659** 
(0.293) 
-0.461 
(0.290) 
-0.559* 
(0.290) 
-0.381 
(0.288) 
-0.733** 
(0.299) 
-0.584** 
(0.294) 
-0.507 
(0.468) 
-0.439 
(0.471) 
Control type         
   System 
revisions 
0.348** 
(0.187) 
0.220 
(0.134) 
0.365*** 
(0.137) 
0.241* 
(0.133) 
0.349** 
(0.148) 
0.398*** 
(0.147) 
0.201 
(0.274) 
0.242 
(0.276) 
   Emergency 
inspections 
-0.797*** 
(0.215) 
0.813*** 
(0.213) 
0.744*** 
(0.213) 
0.762*** 
(0.212) 
0.727*** 
(0.241) 
0.640*** 
(0.238) 
0.125 
(0.652) 
0.235 
(0.666) 
   Other 
controls 
-1.019*** 
(0.306) 
-0.951*** 
(0.305) 
-1.018*** 
(0.316) 
-0.959*** 
(0.306) 
-0.840*** 
(0.323) 
-0.868*** 
(0.324) 
-0.683 
(0.834) 
-0.753 
(0.836) 
Year 0.084*** 
(0.012) 
0.074*** 
(0.012) 
  0.121*** 
(0.015) 
 0.105** 
(0.041) 
 
Periods         
   2006 – 2011    0.629*** 
(0.110) 
0.548*** 
(0.108) 
 0.896*** 
(0.133) 
 1.372*** 
(0.417) 
Monitoring 
classification 
        
   Normal     -0.527*** 
(0.190) 
-0.505*** 
(0.188) 
  
Items 
controlled 
        
   5 – 10     0.269** 
(0.136) 
0.210 
(0.135) 
  
   10+     0.497*** 
(0.175) 
0.365** 
(0.174) 
  
N 1602 1602 1602 1602 1487 1487 447 447 
Log likelihood -1019.87 -1034.87 -1027.21 -1041.04 -939.97 -951.06 -298.76 -295.78 
LR chi2 (7) 113.47 83.47 98.78 71.14 134.01 111.82 18.40 24.36 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.002 
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.039 0.046 0.033 0.067 0.056 0.030 0.040 
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable: 1 = consecutive violations, 0 = no consecutive violations. 
Reference categories: Oil and gas sector, risk class 1, inspections, 1997 - 2005, particular priority, 0 - 5 items.  
See table 5.1. for more details on the variables. 
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5.2.1. Hypotheses on firm characteristics 
Industry  
The rejection of H1a: Oil and gas less compliant, leads us to question the viability of H1b: More 
consecutive violations in oil and gas. Here, we postulate that firms in oil and gas have a negative 
effect on consecutive violations compared to firms in land-based industry. Hypotheses H1b was 
initially based on the notion that firms in the oil and gas sector would have more serious 
violations, that would take longer to correct between the controls. From Table 5.2 we see that 
industry is significant at the 95% level or higher in 2A and 2Cat the 90% level in model 
estimations 2H and 2G. The dummy coefficient for land-based industry has a positive effect on 
consecutive violations compared to oil and gas. This is opposite of our expectation, and we must 
therefore reject the hypothesis H1b: More consecutive violations in oil and gas.  
 
There might be many reasons for the rejection of H1b, such as the large differences in both firm 
size and type of operations within the land-based industry. Compared to oil and gas we assume 
that there is a presence of smaller sized firms within land-based industry. For these smaller firms, 
we suspect that the violations may be caused by a lack of resources, limited knowledge about the 
regulatory framework, inability to comply or any combination of these. This is supported by a 
study performed by Winter and May (2001) on Danish farmers’ compliance to agro-
environmental direct regulations. Here, the authors find that the ability to comply, especially in 
terms of awareness of rules, plays a critical role in determining if farmers have deviations.  
 
Becker (1968), on the other hand, makes the assumption that firms will speculate in breaking the 
law if it is considered profitable in the long term. According to Walle (2003), NEA reacts with 
strict sanctions if there is suspicion that the firm speculates in breaking the law. In this case, the 
penalty will reflect previous behavior, such that firms with recurring non-compliance will 
receive higher penalties than firms that have a history of compliance. It can be argued that NEA 
sends a signal to the firms with these stricter penalties; although the monitoring and enforcement 
of compliance to a large degree is based on trust, firms will lose this trust if deliberate violations 
are suspected. However, we have no evidence in supporting the claim that firms will 
successively break the law whenever they find it profitable. 
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Risk Class  
In H2b: Less repeated offenders in low-risk firms, we propose that low-risk firms, in risk class 3 
and 4, have a negative effect on consecutive violations compared to firms in risk class 1. As risk 
class 3 is only significant in 2E at the 90% level, this is a weak statistical result, and we cannot 
assume the variable to be explained with accuracy. Risk class 4, on the other hand, is significant 
in four of the eight model estimations at the 90% level or higher, and the accuracy of the results 
regarding risk class 4 is somewhat higher. In model estimation 2E, risk class 3 has a negative 
coefficient. Similarly, risk class 4 has a negative sign in model estimations 2A, 2C, 2E and 2F. 
For risk class 3, our results are inconclusive. For risk class 4, on the other hand, we cannot reject 
hypothesis H2b as we find that these firms are less likely to have consecutive violations 
compared to firms in the strictest risk class. After rejecting H2a: Less compliance in risk class 1, 
this result is somewhat surprising. However, we assume that this might be caused by the ability 
of firms in risk class 4 to correct minor violations between controls.  
 
Nadeau (1997) performed a study of EPA’s effectiveness in reducing the duration of plant-level 
non-compliance. In this study, Nadeau treated non-compliance as something that occurs over a 
period of time, rather than a momentary occurrence. Results of the study showed that increases 
in monitoring and enforcement activity lead to reductions of the expected violation time. Our 
findings, on the other hand, indicate that firms faced with higher levels of monitoring and 
enforcement, such as risk class 1, have a larger share of consecutive violations. Our findings 
show opposite results of what Nadeau suggests in his studies. However, we keep in mind that 
risk class 1 is subject to a substantially higher control frequency and thoroughness compared to 
lower risk classes. Thus, we have to be aware that there may be undetected violations in the 
lower risk classes. There are also limitations in our data, and the validity of the results are 
questionable as there are several model estimations where the dummy variables for risk class 3 
and 4 are not significant. 
5.2.2. Hypotheses on monitoring methods  
We propose in hypothesis H4c: More repeated offenders after 2005 that controls performed in 
the period 2006 - 2011 will have a positive effect on consecutive violations compared to those 
before this period. To put it more simply, we assumed that the financial crisis led to more 
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repeated violations. Our postulation is based on the notion that firms started to experience the 
early onset of the financial crisis already two years prior to the market hit, around 2006. 
 
The dummy variable for the period 2006 - 2011 is significant at the 99% level in model 
estimations 2C, 2D, 2F and 2H, indicating that controls performed after 2005 are more likely to 
report consecutive violations. Thus, we cannot reject hypothesis H4c. We expect that this is due 
to the limited resources firms’ experienced during the financial crisis, and that the means to 
correct already existing violations were limited. Indications of this can also be found within the 
literature. Stafford (2002) states that correction of violations takes time, especially if the 
installment of new technology is required. Additionally, Laffont’s studies (1995) indicate that 
environmental regulatory policies can induce a greater focus on cost-minimization, and that the 
trade-off created can lead firms to take more risk. Consequently, costly investments in time-
consuming processes that are not relevant to the production performance of the firm are not 
likely to be prioritized during times where firms experience particular financial strain.  
 
Table 5.5 Findings of expected signs for Model 2: Consecutive violations 
Hypotheses Variable Expected sign Reject?  
Firm characteristics    
H1b: More consecutive violations in oil and gas Land-based industry - Yes 
H2b: Less repeated offenders in low-risk firms Risk class 3 & 4 - ? 
    
Time period    
H4c: More repeated offenders after 2005 2006 – 2011  + No 
For a detailed description of risk classes, see Table 4.1.  
Yes denotes that the null hypothesis is rejected. No denotes that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
To summarize the findings in Model 2, we saw significant effects of industry period. The 
hypothesis for industry was rejected, while we could not reject our postulation regarding period. 
Results regarding risk class were inconclusive. We acknowledge that a hypothesis on control 
type should have been postulated, as this variable proved to be a significant predictor. 
5.3. Model 3: Severe deviations 
After having examined the results from Model 1 and 2, with compliance and consecutive 
violations as the dependent outcome, we are now interested in examining the factors that lead to 
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the most serious offenses. Severity of the violations is interesting because the economic 
consequences, as well as risk of prosecution and loss of reputation, is much greater if firms are 
caught with severe deviations. Each separate model estimation is denoted 3A through 3H, where 
3A - 3D tests the complete data set. 3E and 3F tests the data set for ‘land-based industry’, while 
3G and 3H tests the restricted sample ‘latest control’. 
 
Before we look at the hypotheses for firm characteristics, we see from Table 5.6 that a majority 
of the coefficients are in fact not statistically significant. This gives us an indication that the 
model is unreliable. In addition, the variables ‘other controls’ and ‘period’ are dropped due to 
homogeneity in the data. Here, no severe deviations were detected in controls before 2006, nor 
have any ‘other control’ ever revealed a severe deviation. We also note the issue of high standard 
errors for most model estimations, particularly high in 3G and 3H. Consequently, we must treat 
Model 3 with some caution, and acknowledge that the results are empirically weak.  
 
Lastly, we note that NEA’s monitoring method should have been included as a factor in our 
hypotheses, as ‘emergency inspections’ is the only variable to be significant in all model 
estimations, although with a rather high standard error. The significance of ‘emergency 
inspections’ in predicting severe deviations is not surprising, as the nature of these controls 
include monitoring when particular suspicion is reported or in the case of large accidents, such as 
an oil spill. 
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Table 5.6 Regression results for Model 3: Severe deviations 
 Complete data set Land-based industry Latest control  (One obs. per firm) 
Explanatory 
variables 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 3F 3G 3H 
Industry         
   Land-based 
industry 
0.452 
(0.700) 
 0.423 
(0.696) 
   -0.432 
(1.006) 
-0.398 
(1.006) 
Risk class         
   Risk class 2 -0.916 
(0.571) 
-0.827 
(0.561) 
-0.820 
(0.573) 
-0.731 
(0.561) 
-1.377** 
(0.629) 
-1.141* 
(0.628) 
0.462 
(0.887) 
0.287 
(0.879) 
   Risk class 3 -0.076 
(0.507) 
0.015 
(0.496) 
0.142 
(0.515) 
 0.228 
(0.505) 
-0.104 
(0.536) 
0.215 
(0.545) 
1.180 
(0.862) 
1.164 
(0.868) 
   Risk class 4 -0.741 
(1.108) 
-0.659 
(1.105) 
-0.447 
(1.123) 
-0.372 
(1.122) 
-0.979 
(1.209) 
-0.524 
(1.253) 
1.098 
(1.330) 
1.060 
(1.340) 
Control type         
   System 
revisions 
0.692 
(0.487) 
0.621 
(0.483) 
0.791 
(0.492) 
0.729 
(0.489) 
0.616 
(0.560) 
0.760 
(0.557) 
2.183*** 
(0.622) 
2.313*** 
(0.631) 
   Emergency 
inspections 
2.751*** 
(0.618) 
2.788*** 
(0.616) 
2.845*** 
(0.618) 
2.891*** 
(0.614) 
1.602** 
(0.689) 
1.699** 
(0.723) 
2.456** 
(1.203) 
2.515** 
(1.214) 
   Other controls          
Year 0.423*** 
(0.082) 
0.422*** 
(0.082) 
  0.521*** 
(0.104) 
 0.290 
(0.185) 
 
Periods^^         
   2006 – 2011          
Monitoring 
classification 
        
   Normal     -3.152*** 
(0.498) 
0.332*** 
(0.468) 
  
Items 
controlled 
        
   5 – 10     0.387 
(0.468) 
0.332 
(0.470) 
  
   10+     -0.563 
(0.900) 
-0.297 
(0.903) 
  
N 1514 1514 735 735 1400 661 439 397 
Log likelihood -124.67 -124.89 -120.44 -120.64 -92.21 -89.43 -62.52 -62.39 
LR chi2 (7) 60.82 60.37 22.29 21.90 97.84 59.19 18.83 15.61 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.016 
Pseudo R2 0.196 0.195 0.085 0.083 0.347 0.249 0.131 0.111 
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
^ The variable ‘other controls’ is dropped as no severe deviations have been detected by this control type. 
^^ The variable period was initially included in model estimations 3C, 3D, 3F and 3H, but was dropped as all severe 
deviations were found in the period 2006 – 2011.  
Dependent variable: 1 = severe deviation detected during the control, 0 = no severe deviation detected during the 
control. 
Reference categories: Oil and gas sector, risk class 1, inspections, 1997 - 2005, particular priority, 0 - 5 items.  
See table 5.1. for more details on the variables. 
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5.3.1. Hypotheses on firm characteristics 
 
Industry 
We postulate in H1c: More severe breaches in oil and gas that firms in land-based industry have 
a negative effect on severity of the deviations compared to oil and gas. Although we had to reject 
hypothesis H1a: Oil and gas less compliant, we are still interested in examining whether firms in 
the oil and gas sector are more likely to have severe deviations. We postulate H1c based on the 
notion that firms in oil and gas generally operate with large-scale operations that by nature 
present a larger threat to the environment. Unfortunately, the results for H1c are inconclusive, 
since the dummy variable for land-based industry is not significant in any model estimations. It 
is probable that this is caused by the very small number of observations of severe deviations in 
the period. However, we will look for patterns in the raw data to see if there have been some 
tendencies of severe breaches for oil and gas in the period 1997 - 2011. We are aware of the 
limitations in these results as it does not consider the effect from other factors.  
 
Table 5.7 Distribution of severe deviations across risk classes 
 Oil and gas industry Land-based industry Total 
Severe deviations 3 29 32 
No severe deviations 112 1458 1570 
Total controls 115 1487 1602 
Percentage of controls 
with severe deviations 2.6% 2.0% 2.0% 
 
 
As seen in Table 5.7 above, the distribution in the data does not correspond with our assumption. 
In the period 1997 - 2011, only 32 severe deviations have been detected, and only three of these 
have been in the oil and gas sector. This means that of all controls in oil and gas, a modest 2.6% 
found severe deviations. In land-based industry, only 2% of controls detected severe deviations. 
The percentage is somewhat higher for controls in the oil and gas sector, but we note that there 
are only 115 observed controls such that the marginal change of one severe deviation is much 
higher. Although we cannot say anything about H1c, it is evident that only 2% of all controls 
revealed major breaches in the period 1997 - 2011.  
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Risk class 
In H2c: Less severe deviations in low-risk firms, we postulate that firms in risk class 3 or 4 are 
less likely to have severe deviations than firms in risk class 1. However, similar problems arise 
for this hypothesis as seen in H1c. The dummy variables for risk class 3 and 4 are not significant 
in any of the model estimations. We will therefore investigate the distribution of severe 
deviations across risk classes. This will not be enough to answer our hypothesis, but it will 
indicate how risk classes have affected the occurrence of severe deviations in the period 1997 - 
2011. 
 
Table 5.8 Distribution of severe deviations across risk classes 
 Risk class 1 Risk class 2 Risk class 3 Risk class 4 Total 
Severe deviations 14 5 12 1 32 
No severe deviations 589 417 495 69 1570 
Total controls 602 422 517 70 1602 
Percentage of controls 
with severe deviations 2.3% 1.2% 2.4% 1.4% 2.0% 
 
From the distribution seen in Table 5.8 above, it is clear that 2.3% of controls of firms in risk 
class 1 have had severe deviations. For firms in the medium risk classes 2 and 3, the result is 
unexpected, with severe deviations detected in 1.2% and 2.4% of the controls respectively. 
Controls at firms in risk class 4, on the other hand, have only found one occurrence of severe 
deviation in the 70 performed controls in the period 1997 - 2011. Although the percentage of 
controls with severe deviations in risk class 4 is low at 1.4%, we keep in mind that the sample 
size in this category is small. Again, we acknowledge that this is merely describing previous 
results, and that we cannot conclude with viable results for hypothesis H2c. 
 
Table 5.9 Findings of expected signs for Model 3: Severe deviations 
Hypotheses Variable Expected sign Reject? 
Firm characteristics    
H1c: More serious breaches in oil and gas  Land-based industry - ? 
H2c: Less severe deviations in low-risk firms Risk class 3 & 4 - ? 
For a detailed description of risk classes, see Table 4.1.  
Yes denotes that the null hypothesis is rejected. No denotes that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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Although our empirical results for the effect of industry and risk class on severe deviations are 
inconclusive, Becker (1968) suggests that higher punishment leads to less violations. In NEA’s 
strategy for enforcement and inspection, swift and decisive action against severe deviations is a 
focal point, and firms caught with severe deviations not only face economic penalties, but also 
potential criminal charges (NEA, 2013). When it comes to severe deviations, it can be argued 
that although the economical penalties from NEA vary between different risk classes, the threat 
of criminal charges is a more substantial one. This threat is the same regardless of firm 
characteristics, and the punishment firms may receive through the legal system is not bound by 
NEA’s characterizations of firms. This line of thought implies that the occurrence of severe 
deviations is influenced by the threat of criminal prosecution. 
 
In terms of the severity of the violation, we have established that there is a low presence of major 
violations. NEA’s enforcement strategy is of such character that firms with severe deviations 
face higher sanctions compared to those firms that merely have deviations. Sanctions are decided 
based on an evaluation made by the NEA officer, and range from 0 - 1 MNOK. These are fine 
warnings, and does not include penalties in case of criminal prosecution. Here, previous studies 
on NEA’s panel data reveals that firms were subject to prosecution in approximately 3% of all 
controls in the period 1992 - 2001 (Nyborg & Telle, 2006). Although the prosecution level is 
generally low, economic sanctions range based on the level of severity of the violation (NEA; 
Orvik, 2015). This is in line with the “principle of marginal deterrence” as examined by Shavell 
(1992). Here, the author suggests that more serious crimes should result in more severe 
punishment than minor crimes, in order to limit the severity of criminal activity (Shavell, 1992). 
It is crucial that the regulator, NEA, understands that firms have to make continuous decisions 
where the dynamics of incentives can affect the severity of the violations.  
5.4. Evidence of Harrington paradox  
Lastly, we will conclude with a discussion on whether there is evidence of what is much argued 
within the literature; that there is a higher compliance rate than anticipated by Becker's model 
(1968) in rational crime theory. We will attempt to answer if this predicament, denoted as the 
“Harrington paradox”, is evident from our data.  
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Harrington’s much discussed paper starts by making three statements;  
(i) For most cases the monitoring frequency is low, 
(ii) Even when violations are discovered, fines or other penalties are rarely assessed and these are 
small compared to the cost of complying, 
(iii) Yet, it is still evident that firms comply most of the time (Harrington, 1988; p.29). 
 
By a brief look into the regulatory environment surrounding pollution permits in Norway, it 
may seem as though there is evidence of Harrington's three statements about compliance.  
Firstly, according to NEA’s monitoring frequency, outlined in Table 2.3, it is clear that most 
firms experience controls less than once a year. Thus, Harrington’s first statement is accurate in 
describing the Norwegian regulatory environment when it comes to non-tradable pollution 
permits. Further, we know that when violations are detected, NEA in most cases will issue a fine 
warning where the firm in question is given a time limit to correct the infringement. If the 
corrections are made and documented within the set time frame, the firm will rarely suffer 
economic consequences (Orvik; NEA, 2015a). In similarity with the studies performed by 
Harrington (1988) and other literature on the topic (Walle, 2003; Telle & Nyborg, 2006), we lack 
data on firms’ cost of compliance. However, we consider Harrington’s second statement to be 
applicable to the same extent as in previous studies. Lastly, serious violations are few and far 
between, and only 2% of the controls performed in the period 1997 - 2011 detected deviations 
deemed as particularly severe.  
 
However, by examining the results in more detail, it is evident that the paradox dissolves. 
According to Harrington, there would be an abundance of compliance among Norwegian firms 
under the conditions stated above. Nonetheless, we see from Section 4.3. Descriptive statistics 
that this is not the case, as 76% of firms are in violation with the permits, and more than 40% of 
firms have consecutive violations. These findings imply that Harrington’s last statement can not 
be applied to the case of Norwegian firms with pollution permits. The low frequency of severe 
deviations at first seem to support Harrington’s paradox, but after further review, we note that 
firms face much stricter penalties, as well as threats of prosecution and a loss of reputation, if 
caught with violations of a more serious manner. Thereby, we conclude that there is a lack of 
evidence of to establish a “Harrington paradox” among Norwegian firms within oil and gas and 
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the land-based industry in the period between 1997 and 2011. This contributes to already 
existing Norwegian literature on the subject that have used data from previous years, across 
several industries (Walle, 2003; Nyborg & Telle, 2006).  
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6. CONCLUSION 
Whether or not firms comply with non-tradable pollution permits hinge on a variety of factors. 
One can assume that when a firm is facing an environmental regulation, there are several 
considerations that will account for the decision they will make; such as the nature of their 
operations, the way in which their permits are inspected, and the potential punishment that 
follows. In this thesis, we have strived to answer what factors attribute to Norwegian firms’ level 
of compliance with pollution permits, and if these differ by: 
i. Firm characteristics 
ii. Monitoring methods 
iii. The period in which the control was performed 
  
Firm characteristics have been investigated based on the industry the firm belongs to and the 
Norwegian Environment Agency’s risk classification of firms. Both variables have been found to 
have a significant impact on compliance and consecutive violations. Here, the general tendency 
is that firms placed in the strictest risk classification will be more induced to comply because of 
the expected threat of higher sanctions and the greater likelihood of detection. Our results 
indicate that operating in land-based industry has a negative effect on compliance compared to 
being in the oil and gas sector. Contrary to our expectations, this indicates that firms in oil and 
gas are more likely to comply. Additionally, we find that operating in land-based industry 
positively affect consecutive violations compared to oil and gas, indicating that firms in oil and 
gas are less likely to have consecutive violations.  
 
When analyzing the effect of risk classifications, we find that being placed in the strictest risk 
class has a positive effect on compliance compared to lower risk classes. In terms of consecutive 
violations, the results regarding the risk classification are questionable. Here, we find weak 
support that being placed in the lowest risk class, risk class 4, has a negative effect on 
consecutive violations, while the results for risk class 3 are inconclusive. Thus, firms in the 
strictest risk class tend to outperform the low-risk firms, refuting our hypotheses. We find no 
evidence that firm characteristics have a significant effect on the severity of violations. 
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Monitoring methods proved to have a significant impact on compliance. The general tendency in 
our results regarding monitoring methods is that more thorough and extensive controls have a 
higher detection rate than the shorter, more superficial inspections. Here, we find that control 
type, number of controlled items and monitoring category are all relevant predictors. In terms of 
the chosen control type, our findings reveal that more extensive system revisions have a negative 
effect on compliance compared to the shorter inspections, indicating that system revisions 
uncover more violations. Further, we find that less thorough controls in the category ‘other 
controls’ positively affect compliance compared to inspections, implying that these detect fewer 
violations. Our findings also indicate that controls where more than five items have been 
inspected uncover more violations than controls where only 1 - 5 items were inspected, as 
controls with 6 - 10 and 10+ controlled items both have a negative effect on compliance.  
 
Further, in a dynamic monitoring environment, real compliance decisions are continuous by 
nature. We find that being placed in the monitoring category of particular priority has a negative 
effect on compliance compared to normal monitoring, indicating that these firms are more likely 
to be found in violation with the pollution permits. Here, the results contradict our other findings 
and we assume this to be due to a causality dilemma. We suspect that the negative influence on 
compliance is not an effect of the firms being placed under particular monitoring, but rather that 
the firms are placed under particular priority monitoring as a result of previous non-compliance.  
 
When it comes to the time and period, we find that the results regarding the year the control was 
performed in are inconclusive. However, our results show that there is a significant effect on 
compliance in regards to whether the control was performed before or after the early onset of the 
financial crisis from 2006. We find that the period from 2006 until 2011 has a negative effect on 
compliance, indicating that firms’ ability to comply with pollution permits decreased in the 
period around the financial crisis. The same effect was found for consecutive violations, such 
that firms were more likely to have consecutive violations in the period around the financial 
crisis than before. 
  
From looking at the three factors that attribute to the level of compliance, we find that more 
thorough monitoring is an important factor to encourage greater compliance among Norwegian 
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firms. These controls also have the potential to reduce the issue of asymmetric information and 
incentivize firm transparency due to the increased difficulty for firms to conceal information 
during longer-lasting and more extensive controls. Additionally, we find that being placed in an 
industry or risk class where the threat of higher sanctions may increase firms’ focus on 
precautionary measures. Consequently, these firm characteristics may result in a reduced number 
of violations. Here, the higher expected penalty encompasses the risk of economic sanctions, the 
potential loss of reputation and the threat of criminal charges.  
 
Although the monitoring frequency is considered to be relatively low in Norway, and few 
offenders are harshly punished, there is little evidence to confirm a “Harrington paradox”, which 
states that there is more compliance than what can be explained by rational crime theory. From 
the data, we find that 76% of all controls performed in the period 1997 - 2011 detect non-
compliance. Although a minority of these are severe deviations, the high rate of non-compliance 
in itself is enough to renounce Harrington’s notion of paradoxical high compliance rates among 
Norwegian firms with pollution permits.  
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1. Policy implications  
Based on our result, it is difficult to conclude with accurate policy recommendations. However, 
from the findings in this thesis, it seems that the Norwegian Environment Agency should 
continue its efforts on performing detailed controls with a rigorous hand. In line with their 
current philosophy, it is important with a clear regulatory presence, which may send a message 
to the firm that there is an increased risk of being caught if violations indeed occurred. More 
information about the agent's hidden characteristics would yield more effective monitoring and 
enforcement methods. Although the nature of direct regulations do not naturally reveal firms 
abatement cost at the margin, it is discussed in the literature that more thorough controls might 
induce the agent to invest in more transparent technology, which in turn would lead to a greater 
probability for detecting violations. 
7.2. Limitations and further research 
We recognize that there are considerable limitations in the available data. The lack of detrimental 
variables, such as the cost of compliance, firm size, revenue and moral motivation of firms, 
limits the viability of our results. Additionally, in our data, violations are classified as either 
normal or severe deviations. We acknowledge that a more detailed differentiation of the 
violations would give a better basis for further policy implications. We consider the urgency of 
the violations, and the level of acuteness of the environmental impact, to be particularly relevant 
when determining how to monitor and enforce compliance to non-tradable pollution permits. 
 
It is evident from the limitations in this thesis, and from existing literature on the topic, that 
predicting firms’ decision whether to comply with environmental regulations or not is difficult. 
Ideally, empirical studies on compliance, monitoring and enforcement should include more 
information about the agent’s hidden characteristics, which in turn would yield more effective 
monitoring and enforcement methods. Thereby, we suggest that there is a need for further 
research on factors that affect compliance, preferably with a better data sample, including more 
relevant predictors. 
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Appendix I 
Table 1A: Correlation matrix 
Variables 
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Compliance 1.000          
Consecutive -0.269 1.000         
Severe 
deviations -0.080 0.055 1.000        
Industry -0.085 0.122 -0.012 1.000       
Risk class -0.187 -0.158 -0.004 0.284 1.000      
Control 
type 0.094 0.042 0.029 -0.080 -0.347 1.000     
Year -0.092 0.042 0.144 -0.099 0.186 -0.203 1.000    
Period -0.131 0.030 0.153 -0.100 0.149 -0.205 0.879 1.0000   
Monitoring 0.163 -0.085 -0.195 0.028 0.049 -0.145 0.075 0.059 1.000  
Items 
controlled -0.152 0.051 -0.018 0.018 -0.002 -0.115 -0.382 -0.373 -0.045 1.000 
The correlation value between year and period has been discussed in Section 5.  
We also note the correlation values between year and controlled items, as well as period and controlled items.  
The rule of thumb is that one should be careful in including variables with a correlation value higher than 0.35 in 
the same regression. However, logistic regressions do not require a complete absence of multicollinearity. 
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